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CRUEL STATE PUNISHMENTS* 
WILLIAM W. BERRY III** 
The Supreme Court has almost systematically expanded Eighth Amendment 
protections over the past decade and a half, adopting categorical limitations to 
the death penalty and juvenile life without parole. With Justice Kennedy’s 
recent retirement, this expansion seems like it might be ending. As this door is 
closing, however, another door may be opening for restricting excessive 
punishments—state constitutional analogues to the Eighth Amendment. A 
close examination of such provisions reveals that some of the provisions use “or” 
instead of “and,” a linguistic difference that suggests many state constitutions 
might be broader than the Eighth Amendment. 
This Article explores the consequences of linguistic differences between the 
Eighth Amendment and its state constitutional analogues, focusing in 
particular on the effect of disjunctive state constitutional provisions. 
Specifically, the Article argues that these linguistic differences open the door to 
broader application of state Eighth Amendment analogues to rein in excessive 
punishment practices of state governments. 
In Part I, the Article begins by providing an overview of Eighth Amendment 
doctrine and the importance of the conjunction in its application to criminal 
sentences. Part II surveys state constitutions and examines the language of the 
provision analogous to the Eighth Amendment, grouping these provisions into 
three broad categories. In Part III, the Article advances its core claim: state 
constitutional prohibitions against “cruel” punishments should limit the ability 
of states to impose disproportionate punishments. Part IV concludes the Article 
by exploring the many practical consequences of limiting the imposition of cruel 
punishments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For much of the twentieth century, the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution was a dead letter.1 The U.S. Supreme Court did not place any 
serious limitations on the use of punishments, with the exception of a 
particular application of cadena temporal in the Philippines2 and the revocation 
of citizenship as a punishment for desertion.3 
In 1972, however, the Court held that the death penalty, as applied, 
constituted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.4 This result was short-lived, with the Court approving new 
capital statutes in several states in 1976.5 Over time, the Court interpreted the 
Eighth Amendment to bar certain uses of the death penalty under its evolving 
standards of decency doctrine.6 Such barred uses include proscriptions against 
implementing mandatory death sentences,7 executing juvenile offenders8 and 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting the imposition of cruel and unusual 
punishments). 
 2. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 357–58, 382 (1910). 
 3. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87, 103 (1958). 
 4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam); see discussion infra Section III.B.2. 
 5. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162–63, 168–69, 186–87 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242, 247–53 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 267–68, 276 (1976).  
 6. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–64, 578–79 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002); Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01, 104; see also discussion infra Section I.B.  
 7. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603–04 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
301 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976). 
 8. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
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intellectually disabled offenders,9 imposing death sentences in non-homicide 
cases of child rape10 and rape,11 and permitting the death penalty in some 
felony murder cases.12 More recently, the Court has restricted the imposition 
of mandatory juvenile life without parole sentences13 and juvenile life without 
parole sentences (“JLWOP”) in non-homicide cases under the Eighth 
Amendment.14 
While these carve-outs have limited certain punishments in specific 
contexts, the practice of the Court has not been to examine punishments on a 
case-by-case basis under the Eighth Amendment, particularly through as-
applied challenges to individual punishments.15 Instead, the Court has largely 
rejected almost all Eighth Amendment challenges to criminal sentences 
outside of the capital and JLWOP exceptions just described.16 
The Court has essentially drawn a bright line between capital and non-
capital sentences (excepting JLWOP), with capital sentences receiving some 
scrutiny under the evolving standards of decency doctrine and non-capital 
sentences receiving virtually none. The standard the Court has used in non-
capital, non-JLWOP cases—gross disproportionality17—creates such a high 
bar that almost no case has met it, despite a number of cases which have 
imposed extreme punishments for rather minor offenses.18 Under the Court’s 
 
 9. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 723–24 (2014); 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 10. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 445–46 (2008). 
 11. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977). 
 12. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798, 801 (1982). But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 
137, 152–158 (1987) (narrowing the Court’s holding in Enmund). For arguments in favor of expanding 
this doctrine, see Guyora Binder, Brenner Fissell & Robert Weisberg, Capital Punishment of 
Unintentional Felony Murder, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141, 1141–44 (2017). See also William W. 
Berry III, Rethinking Capital Felony Murder, JOTWELL (Feb. 12, 2018), https://crim.jotwell.com 
/rethinking-capital-felony-murder/ [https://perma.cc/Q4G3-53L7] (reviewing Binder et al., supra). 
 13. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016) (finding that Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460 (2012), established a new constitutional rule limiting JLWOP); Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. 
 14. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
 15. See discussion infra Part I. 
 16. See discussion infra Part I. 
 17. In the Court’s usage, “gross disproportionality” means that the sentence imposed is grossly 
excessive in light of the criminal actions of the defendant and the applicable purposes of 
punishments, including utilitarian purposes. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289–93 (1983); see also 
Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 271 (2005) 
(developing a robust conception of “political” proportionality and explaining that proportionality can 
be broader than the retributive concept of “just deserts”). But see John F. Stinneford, Rethinking 
Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 961 (2011) 
(arguing that Eighth Amendment conceptions of proportionality should be based only on just deserts 
retribution). 
 18. Indeed, the Court has seldom held that a non-capital, non-JLWOP sentence violated the 
Eighth Amendment. This is true even where the sentence seems particularly excessive. See Lockyer 
v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 77 (2003) (affirming on habeas review that two consecutive sentences of 
twenty-five years to life for stealing approximately $150 of videotapes was reasonable where 
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narrow application, the Eighth Amendment has thus placed almost no 
limitations on non-capital, non-JLWOP sentences, and its limits on capital 
and JLWOP sentences have been only categorical. 
Future expansion of the Eighth Amendment also seems unlikely. While 
the Court adopted five categorical limitations between 2002 and 2012, those 
cases were largely 5-4 decisions.19 The fifth vote—Justice Anthony Kennedy—
retired at the end of 2018. His replacement is more ideologically conservative 
and unlikely to continue Kennedy’s voting pattern in similar cases.20 
Even so, the imposition of constitutional limits on excessive criminal 
sentences is still possible. As the Supreme Court of Washington demonstrated 
in late 2018, state constitutions also place restrictions on criminal sentences.21 
The Washington Supreme Court held that the death penalty and JLWOP 
violated its state constitution.22 
Indeed, almost all states have an analogue to the Eighth Amendment.23 
In most states, the application of such provisions has not exceeded the scope 
 
defendant had three prior felony convictions); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18, 30–31 
(2003) (affirming sentence of twenty-five years to life for stealing approximately $1200 of golf clubs, 
where defendant had four prior felony convictions); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 994, 
996 (1991) (affirming sentence of life without parole for first offense of possessing 672 grams of 
cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370–72 (1982) (per curiam) (affirming two consecutive 
sentences of twenty years for possession with intent to distribute and distribution of nine ounces of 
marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265–66 (1980) (affirming mandatory life sentence for 
felony theft of $120.75 by false pretenses where defendant had two prior convictions). But see Solem, 
463 U.S. at 279–84 (reversing sentence of life without parole for presenting a no account check for 
$100, where defendant had six prior felony convictions); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) 
(holding that removal of citizenship is an unconstitutional punishment for desertion); Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (holding the punishment of cadena temporal (hard labor) 
unconstitutional in light of the offense committed). 
 19. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012); Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 20. Clare Foran & Joan Biskupic, Where Brett Kavanaugh Stands on Key Issues, CNN (Oct. 6, 
2018) https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/politics/kavanaugh-on-the-issues/index.html [https://perma 
.cc/R8TH-XAVY]. 
 21. State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 345–46 (Wash. 2018) (abolishing juvenile life without parole 
under the state constitution); State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 626–27 (Wash. 2018) (abolishing the 
death penalty under the state constitution). 
 22. Bassett, 428 P.3d at 345–46; Gregory, 427 P.3d at 626–27. 
 23. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 15; ARK. 
CONST. art. II, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 20; CONN. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 11; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. XVII; HAW. 
CONST. art. I, § 12; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST., art. I, § 11; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 16; 
IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 17; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RGTS. § 9; KY. CONST. § 17; LA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 20; ME CONST. art. I, § 9; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 16; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 
XXVI; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 28; MO. 
CONST. art. I, § 21; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 6; 
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 33; N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 12; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; N.Y. CONST. art 
I, § 5; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; OKLA. CONST. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1201 (2020) 
1206 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
of the Eighth Amendment, meaning that the state constitutional provisions 
have not added any further restrictions beyond that of the federal provision.24 
However, a careful examination of state analogues to the Eighth 
Amendment reveals that many state provisions use different language than the 
U.S. Constitution.25 As such, while the limits of federal and state constitutions 
may overlap, alternative language in state constitutions suggests that some 
state provisions, as in Washington, may place greater restrictions on state 
punishment practices than the U.S. Constitution.26 
For instance, some state constitutions prohibit “cruel or unusual” 
punishments, as opposed to “cruel and unusual” punishments.27 As explored 
below, this means that punishments that are cruel would violate the state 
constitution, irrespective of whether they were also unusual.28 
This Article explores the consequences of linguistic differences between 
the Eighth Amendment and its state constitutional analogues, focusing in 
particular on the effect of disjunctive state constitutional provisions. 
Specifically, the Article argues that these linguistic differences open the door 
to broader application of state Eighth Amendment analogues to rein in 
excessive punishment practices of state governments. 
In Part I, the Article begins by providing an overview of Eighth 
Amendment doctrine and the importance of the conjunction in its application 
to criminal sentences. Part II surveys the state constitutions and examines the 
language of the state constitution provisions that are analogous to the Eighth 
Amendment, grouping these provisions into three broad categories. In Part 
III, the Article advances its core claim: state constitutional prohibitions 
against “cruel” punishments should limit the ability of states to impose 
disproportionate punishments. Part IV concludes the Article by exploring the 
practical consequences of limiting the imposition of cruel punishments. 
I.  EIGHTH AMENDMENT CONJUNCTIVES 
The Supreme Court has never developed an explicit doctrinal rule 
concerning the meaning of the conjunction “and” in the Eighth Amendment. 
 
art. II, § 9; OR. CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, § 13; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 8; S.C. CONST. 
art. I, § 15; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 9; VA. 
CONST. art. I, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, 
§ 6; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 14. 
 24. See discussion infra Part II. 
 25. See discussion infra Part II. 
 26. See discussion infra Part II. 
 27. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17; KAN. 
CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS. § 9; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 28; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 6; N.H. CONST. 
pt. I, art. 33; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; WYO. 
CONST. art. 1, § 14. 
 28. See discussion infra Part III. 
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The Court’s implicit assumption, though, has been that punishments must be 
both “cruel” and “unusual” to be unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment. 29 To be sure, reading the Eighth Amendment to proscribe 
criminal sentences has occurred only when the punishments in question were 
cruel and unusual under the Court’s evolving standards of decency doctrine.30 
Before exploring this application, however, it is instructive to analyze the 
different possible meanings of this central conjunction to see the interpretive 
options available to the Court. 
A. Interpreting “AND” 
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution proscribes “cruel and 
unusual” punishments.31 There are multiple possible ways to read the “and” in 
this phrase. First, “and” can be conjunctive, meaning “and” or “both.” This 
reading would proscribe punishments that are both cruel and unusual. Scholars 
have most commonly read the Eighth Amendment in this way.32 
A second reading of the conjunction “and” is disjunctive, meaning “or.” 
This reading would proscribe both punishments that are cruel (irrespective of 
usualness) and punishments that are unusual (irrespective of cruelty). 
 
 29. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 136 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Eighth 
Amendment forbids punishments that are cruel and unusual.”); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 42 
(1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“To state a claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 
a party must prove not only that the challenged conduct was both cruel and unusual, but also that it 
constitutes punishment.”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (“According to its terms, 
then, by forbidding ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ the Clause disables the Legislature from 
authorizing particular forms or “modes” of punishment—specifically, cruel methods of punishment 
that are not regularly or customarily employed.”) (citations omitted); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 
447 (1890) (“The courts of New York held that the mode adopted in this instance might be said to be 
unusual because it was new, but that it could not be assumed to be cruel in the light of that common 
knowledge which has stamped certain punishments as such . . . .”). 
 30. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419–20, 422–23 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 560, 563 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–13 (2002); Tison v. Arizona, 481 
U.S. 137, 147–48 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788–89 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 592–93 (1977). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 32. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 120 (1997); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14 (1980); ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 116 (2012); Akhil 
Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1779 (2011); Bradford R. Clark, 
Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, and the Eighth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1149, 
1200 (2006); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1997); David B. Hershenov, Why Must Punishment Be Unusual as Well 
as Cruel to Be Unconstitutional?, 16 PUB. AFFS. Q. 77 (2002); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, When 
the Federal Death Penalty Is “Cruel and Unusual”, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 831–32 (2006); Meghan J. 
Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments that Are Both Cruel and 
Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 572 (2010). 
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Although a plausible reading, the general consensus is that such a reading may 
be in tension with the more natural conjunctive reading of the text.33 
A third reading of “cruel and unusual” could be as a singular, unitary 
concept that interlocks the two words. Under this approach, “cruel and 
unusual” comprises a single, inseparable idea. 34 In other words, there is 
something in the nature of cruel punishments that is unusual and something 
in the nature of unusual punishments that is cruel.35 
A fourth reading of “cruel and usual” could be as a tautology. This would 
mean that cruel and unusual are essentially synonyms, or two ways of saying 
the same thing.36 Thus, cruel punishments are unusual punishments, and 
unusual punishments are cruel punishments.37 
Finally, one can read “cruel and unusual” as a hendiadys, meaning that 
the second term essentially modifies the first. 38  Under this interpretive 
approach, cruel and unusual means unusually cruel.39 
B. The Evolving Standards of Decency 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the meaning of the 
conjunction in the Eighth Amendment—the meaning of the “and” that links 
cruel and unusual in its evolving standards of decency cases. It is certainly 
possible to read these cases as not bothering to disentangle the two concepts of 
cruel and unusual.40 The Court’s cases that apply the Eighth Amendment do 
make clear, however, that elements of both cruelty and unusualness are part of 
its basic test, at least in the capital context.41 
 
 33. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 376 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Although 
the Eighth Amendment literally reads as prohibiting only those punishments that are both ‘cruel’ and 
‘unusual,’ . . . .”); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 881, 883 n.3 (2009) (“The conjunction ‘and’ in ‘cruel and unusual’ notwithstanding . . . .”); 
Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 491 (2005) 
(“The Justices sometimes have said that an unconstitutional punishment must be both cruel and 
unusual, just as the literal text provides.”). 
 34. See, e.g., HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, 
AND POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 96 (1987); KENT GREENAWALT, INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION 113, 119 (2015); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 519, 545 n.120 (2003); Stinneford, supra note 17, at 968–69. 
 35. See, e.g., BEDAU, supra note 34, at 96; GREENAWALT, supra note 34, at 119; Nelson, supra 
note 34, at 545 n.120; Stinneford, supra note 17, at 968–69. 
 36. JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE 
FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 180–81 (2012). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 
102 VA. L. REV. 687, 712 (2016). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only 
Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 591–92 (2010). 
 41. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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In death penalty cases, the Court has applied its evolving standards of 
decency test to assess whether particular punishments are cruel and unusual.42 
This test has two components: one that arguably corresponds to the concept of 
“cruel” and one that arguably corresponds to the concept of “unusual.”43 The 
first part of the test examines the predominant practice of the states with 
respect to the punishment at issue.44 For instance, in Roper v. Simmons,45 
where the Court considered the constitutionality of juvenile death sentences, 
the Court counted the number of states that allowed the imposition of such 
sentences.46 By counting the states that still executed juveniles, the Court 
could ascertain the societal standard of decency and whether the practice in 
question was widely accepted or largely abandoned.47 
In addition to counting states, the Court has also looked to jury 
sentencing outcomes, the direction of change with respect to the practice in 
the form of pending and recently adopted legislation, and international 
norms.48 This inquiry embodies the concept of “unusual” in the language of 
the Eighth Amendment. By examining the consensus of practices in the states, 
the Supreme Court determines whether the punishment in question is 
consistent with the current standard of decency manifested by the states.49 In 
essence, the first part of the evolving standards of decency test, by engaging in 
its state-counting inquiry, is asking whether the punishment is unusual.50 
After the Court examines what the societal consensus is with respect to a 
particular punishment practice, the Court “brings its own judgment to bear” 
in the second part of the test.51 This part of the test uses the purposes of 
punishment—retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation—to determine 
whether any of the purposes justifies the imposition of the punishment.52 The 
 
 42. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304. 
 43. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304. 
 44. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304. 
 45. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 46. Id. at 564–66. 
 47. Id. at 567. 
 48. Id. at 575–78. 
 49. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304; Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 362 (1989); Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 828–30 (1988); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977). 
 50. This inquiry has taken different forms, including assessing jury verdicts, the direction of 
legislative changes, and international consensus. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304; 
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782. 
 51. This approach originated in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). “[F]or the Constitution 
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the 
acceptability of the death penalty and the Eighth Amendment.” Coker, 433 U.S. at 597, 
 52. See, e.g., Kennedy, 441 U.S. at 407; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
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Court here assesses whether the punishment is proportional or excessive with 
respect to all of the applicable purposes.53 
For instance, in Roper, the Court assessed whether the purposes of 
retribution or deterrence could justify the execution of juvenile offenders.54 
The Court’s opinion explained that juvenile offenders were less culpable, 
meaning retribution did not support a capital sentence, and that juvenile 
offenders were impulsive in a way that made it unlikely that capital sentences 
would deter them.55 
This inquiry, at its core, focuses on whether the punishment at issue is 
cruel in the sense that it is excessive and otherwise unjustified by some 
legitimate purpose. 56  A cruel punishment thus consists of punishment 
disproportionate to the conduct and character of the defendant in light of the 
purpose of the punishment in question.57 
In its cases, the Court has interestingly found every punishment it has 
considered to have the same outcome with respect to the subjective and 
objective tests, at least in the death penalty context.58 In other words, the 
Court always supports its view that a particular punishment is unusual by 
pointing to its cruelty.59 Perhaps this substantiates the reading of cruel and 
unusual as a hendiadys—meaning that the Eighth Amendment is really about 
prohibiting punishments that are unusually cruel.60 
It thus seems that cruelty without some unusualness is not enough to 
violate the Eighth Amendment, at least in light of the Court’s cases to date. 
Applying this principle under state constitutions with the same language 
seems to point to similar applications, barring other considerations. 
 
 53. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304. 
 54. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441; Roper, 557 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. See 
generally William W. Berry III, Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69, 97–98 (2011) 
(relating the subjective purposes of punishment analysis to the cruelty inquiry); John F. Stinneford, 
The Original Meaning of ‘Cruel’, 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 441–42 (2017) (same). 
 57. See generally William W. Berry III, Separating Retribution from Proportionality: A Response to 
Stinneford, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 61 (2011) (arguing that proportionality can refer to both 
retributive and utilitarian purposes of punishment); Stinneford, supra note 17, at 914–17 (linking 
proportionality solely to retribution). 
 58. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304; Coker, 433 
U.S. at 584. 
 59. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304; see also 
Stinneford, supra note 17, at 921 (“Rather, in every case where the Court has found a punishment 
unconstitutionally cruel, it has claimed to find a societal consensus against the punishment.”). 
 60. Bray, supra note 38, at 706. 
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C. Gross Disproportionality 
In addition to its evolving standards of decency jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has adopted a different test under the Eighth Amendment in 
non-capital, non-JLWOP cases.61 This approach asks the question whether the 
punishment is grossly disproportionate to the criminal conduct at issue.62 
With one exception, the Court has uniformly held over the past fifty years 
that non-capital, non-JLWOP punishments do not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.63 
In Solem v. Helm,64 the one case in which the Court found an adult non-
capital punishment—a life without parole sentence for a seventh non-violent 
felony—to be disproportionate, the Court advanced a basic test to assess 
proportionality. 65  Specifically, the Court explained that the Eighth 
Amendment required consideration of (1) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the 
same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same 
crime in other jurisdictions.66 Note that the Solem test incorporates both cruel 
considerations—the gravity of the offense—and unusual considerations—the 
sentences imposed upon other offenders.67 
The Supreme Court soon after limited the scope of Solem in Harmelin v. 
Michigan68 in a divided opinion.69 Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence 
reemphasized that the Eighth Amendment only bars disproportionate 
punishments that are “grossly disproportionate,” with reviewing courts 
granting “substantial deference to legislative determinations.”70 Harmelin thus 
reestablished that “the Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality.”71 
 
 61. See also Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time? Examining the Supreme Court’s “Culture 
of Death”, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861, 861 (2008) (distinguishing between capital and non-capital 
sentencing systems). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of 
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009) 
(describing the “two-track approach” to sentencing). 
 62. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 11–12 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 
64 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959 (1991); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372–73 
(1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980). 
 63. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 64. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).  
 65. Id. at 290–95.  
 66. Id. at 292. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 69. Id. at 958. I have argued elsewhere that Harmelin was wrongly decided. See William W. 
Berry III, Unusual Deference, 70 FLA. L. REV. 315, 328–30 (2018). 
 70. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998–1001. 
 71. Id. at 1001. 
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The part of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion joined by all five Justices in 
Harmelin also found that while Harmelin’s sentence of life without parole for 
a first-time drug offense might be cruel, it was not unusual.72 One way, then, 
of understanding the gross disproportionality test is as requiring a punishment 
to be both cruel and unusual. 73  The corollary of this concept is that a 
punishment might be cruel even if it is not grossly disproportionate under the 
Eighth Amendment. As explored below, a logical distinction might be that a 
strictly disproportionate punishment might be cruel, but it must also be 
unusual to meet the gross disproportionality standard under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
Further, the part of the majority opinion joined by all five Justices also 
emphasized the distinction between capital and non-capital cases under the 
Eighth Amendment as developed in prior cases.74 If the analysis under the 
evolving standards of decency doctrine mandates a strict scrutiny level of 
review of the punishment, its cruelty, and its unusualness, then the analysis 
under the gross disproportionality test mirrors a rational basis test, where 
there is a strong presumption that the punishment is constitutional.75 
The justification for this difference in approach relates to the death 
penalty. Until 2010, the Court restricted its application of the evolving 
standards of decency to capital cases.76 The rationale for this distinction was 
that “death is different,” meaning that the uniqueness of the death penalty 
justified heightened scrutiny in capital cases.77 Specifically, the death penalty 
is both the most severe punishment and an irrevocable punishment, which 
warrants increased attention from the Court.78 
 
 72. Id. at 994–95. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Id. at 995–96. 
 75. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 
73, 77 (2003); Harmelin, 501 U.S at 999; Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372–73 (1982); Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980). But see Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving 
Standards”, 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 414 (2009) (“[The] Supreme Court [is] naturally inclined towards 
majoritarian decisionmaking anyway, rendering the debate over ‘evolving standards’ largely moot.”). 
 76. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) (extending the evolving standard of decency 
analysis to a non-homicide, non-capital case). 
 77. Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), is apparently the 
origin of the Court’s “death is different” capital jurisprudence. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 286 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is a unique punishment in the United States.”); see also Jeffrey 
Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 
117–118 (2004) (discussing the Court’s death-is-different jurisprudence and requesting additional 
procedural safeguards “when humans play at God”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober 
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 355, 370 (1995) (crediting Justice Brennan as the originator of this line of argument). 
 78. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978) (stating that death is qualitatively 
and profoundly different from other penalties); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287 (1976) 
(distinguishing the penalty of death as “unique and irreversible”). 
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In 2010, the Court held that juvenile offenders were also different, 
adding JLWOP sentences to the category of punishments receiving evolving 
standards of decency review.79 Two years later, the Court cemented this new 
category of differentness in holding that mandatory JLWOP sentences 
violated the Eighth Amendment.80 
D. Differentness as a Type of Unusualness 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment cases treat capital cases 
and JLWOP cases as warranting close review and largely ignore non-capital, 
non-juvenile cases. One reading of the differentness concept might be that 
“different” cases are in some sense “unusual.” Indeed, death cases and JLWOP 
cases are unique in such a way as to warrant, at least according to the Court, a 
heightened level of Eighth Amendment scrutiny. 
By contrast, non-capital, non-JLWOP cases are not different, not 
unusual, and as a result, receive a presumption of constitutionality. As Justice 
Scalia indicated in Harmelin, not all cruel punishments are unusual.81 Because 
such punishments are generally common, they do not violate the Eighth 
Amendment even if they are excessive, at least under the Court’s current 
jurisprudence. 
Thus, one can read the absence of constitutional limitations in such cases 
as related, at least in part, to the conjunctive nature of the constitutional 
proscription. In other words, it is possible to determine that the reason that 
the Supreme Court does not accord non-capital, non-JLWOP cases any 
meaningful Eighth Amendment scrutiny is that it has implicitly concluded 
that the punishments in such cases are not unusual. 
II.  CONJUNCTIVE AND DISJUNCTIVE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Most state constitutions contain analogues to the Eighth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution. These analogues often use different language than the 
Eighth Amendment, at least with respect to the conjunctions that connect the 
substantive linguistic provisions. The state constitutions that proscribe cruel 
punishments or unusual punishments generally fall into three categories: (1) 
provisions that prohibit cruel “and” unusual punishments, (2) provisions that 
prohibit cruel “or” unusual punishments, and (3) provisions that adopt an 
alternative approach. 
 
 79. Graham, 560 U.S. 48, 82. 
 80. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 460 (2012); William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment 
Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1053 (2013); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 724 
(2016) (holding that the Miller prohibition on mandatory JLWOP applies retroactively); William W. 
Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 76–77 (2015). 
 81. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991). 
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Where the language is identical to the U.S. Constitution, state supreme 
courts can reasonably align the interpretation of the state constitutional 
provision with the application of the federal constitutional provision. In such 
cases, the state constitution typically does not add any additional proscriptions 
to the limits imposed by the Eighth Amendment.82 
Even though similar in some respects, the state constitutional restrictions 
contain different language that one can reasonably read to depart from the 
U.S. Constitution. At the very least, state supreme court justices may 
interpret the state constitutional provisions to be broader than the Eighth 
Amendment in light of the linguistic differences between the two provisions.83 
A survey of the state constitutional analogues to the Eighth Amendment 
demonstrates that these differences, while perhaps subtle, arguably give rise to 
meaningful differences in application. Some states recognize these differences, 
while others choose to disregard them. 
In capital cases, states have typically followed the Eighth Amendment 
with respect to its categorical limitations and have not created additional 
categories of proscription. State courts have also not recognized “as applied” 
challenges to the death penalty either. The exceptions to this, of course, are 
the few cases where states have declared the death penalty unconstitutional 
under the state constitution. 
As a result, the analysis below focuses on the use of state constitutional 
provisions to review the imposition of non-capital punishments, putting aside 
the recent categorical restrictions on certain JLWOP sentences. 
A. Cruel “AND” Unusual 
Where the state constitutional provision uses identical language to the 
Eighth Amendment, a fair reading of the meaning of the state constitution can 
be that it simply encompasses the same meaning as the U.S. Constitution, at 
least with respect to the language at issue. Twenty-three states84 currently 
have analogues to the Eighth Amendment that use the “cruel and unusual” 
language. 
While the states with these provisions have generally followed the 
Supreme Court’s approach under the Eighth Amendment in interpreting their 
state constitutions, there are four with notable exceptions, three of which have 
additional language in the state constitution. 
 
 82. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 83. See discussion infra Sections II.B–II.C. 
 84. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See discussion infra Part II. 
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1.  Adopting the Eighth Amendment Approach 
These jurisdictions generally follow the Supreme Court’s application of 
the Eighth Amendment to non-capital cases, albeit with a few nuances and 
exceptions. These state courts have generally concluded that their Eighth 
Amendment analogues do not change the analysis. 
a. Identical Language (Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, New Mexico, 
New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin) 
Arizona’s constitutional analogue uses identical language to the Eighth 
Amendment.85 Arizona courts, not surprisingly, assess the constitutionality of 
criminal sentences under the Arizona Constitution using the Supreme Court’s 
Eighth Amendment analysis.86 As such, the state prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment does not provide greater protection than its federal 
counterpart.87 Given the narrow scope of the Eighth Amendment’s gross 
disproportionality principle as applied to non-capital, non-JLWOP cases, 
Arizona courts have generally rejected such challenges.88 
Colorado’s state constitution also uses identical language to the Eighth 
Amendment. 89  Its application tracks the Eighth Amendment’s gross 
disproportionality test90 and requires that a sentence “shock the conscience” of 
the court to be unconstitutional.91 In addition, similar to Harmelin, Colorado 
courts have emphasized that the individual characteristics of a particular 
 
 85. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 15. 
 86. See State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378, 380–81 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc) (declining to consider the 
state provision separately from the federal one). 
 87. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 66 (Ariz. 2003); State v. Long, 83 P.3d 618, 619 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2004); State v. Berger, 103 P.3d 298, 298 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), vacated in part en banc, 134 
P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006). 
 88. See, e.g., Berger, 134 P.3d at 378; State v. Myers, 570 P.2d 1252, 12555 (Ariz. 1977); 
Wigglesworth v. Mauldin, 990 P.2d 26, 26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (en banc); State v. Lujan, 911 P.2d 
562, 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State v. DePiano, 926 P.2d 508, 517 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995), aff’d in 
part and vacated in part, 926 P.2d 494 (Ariz. 2003); State v. Hamilton, 868 P.2d 986, 986 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1993); State v. Zimmer, 874 P.2d 964, 965 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Olsen, 760 P.2d 603, 
603 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). But see State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 64 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc) (finding that 
the mandatory minimum sentencing of a twenty-year-old to fifty-two years without the possibility of 
parole is so grossly disproportionate to the crime of “having voluntary sex with two post-pubescent 
teenage girls” as to violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 89. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 20 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 90. Close v. People, 48 P.3d 528, 532–533 (Colo. 2002) (en banc), abrogated by 48 P.3d 528 
(Colo. 2019); People v. Mershon, 874 P.2d 1025, 1025 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), abrogated by 451 P.3d 
415 (Colo. 2019); People v. Coolidge, 953 P.2d 949, 951–52 (Colo. App. 1997). 
 91. People v. Fulmer, 524 P.2d 606, 607 (Colo. 1974); People v. O’Donnell, 518 P.2d 945, 948 
(en banc) (Colo. 1974); Trujillo v. People, 496 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Colo. 1972) (en banc); People v. 
Nieto, 715 P.2d 1262, 1264–65 (Colo. App. 1985); People v. McKnight, 588 P.2d 886, 888 (Colo. 
App. 1978), cert. dismissed en banc, 607 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1980). 
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defendant are irrelevant to the cruel and unusual punishment inquiry.92 As 
with the U.S. Constitution, Colorado punishments typically do not rise to the 
level of gross disproportionality.93 
Georgia uses language identical to the Eighth Amendment, along with an 
additional prohibition against abuse. 94  Georgia’s application of the state 
constitution largely tracks the Eighth Amendment, and defines cruel and 
unusual punishments as those (1) unsupported by the purposes of punishment 
or (2) grossly disproportionate. 95  Like other states, the Georgia cases 
emphasize that the only sentences that will violate the state constitution are 
ones that shock the conscience, as the courts should defer to the legislature in 
almost every situation.96 
Idaho’s state constitution also uses language identical to the Eighth 
Amendment. 97  Idaho’s courts have consistently tracked Supreme Court 
precedent in applying the cruel and unusual punishment clause and using the 
gross disproportionality test.98 Idaho courts even explicitly overruled an Idaho 
precedent99 that followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Solem v. Helm100 to 
reflect the U.S. Supreme Court’s later decision that essentially overruled 
 
 92. Coolidge, 953 P.2d at 949. 
 93. See, e.g., People v. Deroulet, 48 P.3d 520, 527 (Colo. 2002) (en banc), abrogated by 454 P.3d 
191 (Colo. 2019); Mershon, 874 P.2d at 1025; Fulmer, 524 P.2d at 606; Wolford v. People, 496 P.2d 
1011, 1013 (Colo. 1972) (en banc); Normand v. People, 440 P.2d 282, 284 (Colo. 1968); Walker v. 
People, 248 P.2d 287, 302–03 (Colo. 1952) (en banc); Coolidge, 953 P.2d at 949; People v. Moya, 899 
P.2d 212, 219–20 (Colo. App. 1994); People v. Cabral, 878 P.2d 1,3 (Colo. App. 1993); People v. 
Valenzuela, 825 P.2d 1015, 1017–18 (Colo. App. 1991), aff’d en banc, 856 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1993); Nieto, 
715 P.2d at 1262. 
 94. GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. XVII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted; nor shall any person be abused in being 
arrested, while under arrest, or in prison.”). 
 95. Johnson v. State, 573 S.E.2d 362, 366 (Ga. 2002); Christian v. State, 819 S.E.2d 682, 686 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2018). 
 96. Johnson, 573 S.E.2d at 366; Lambeth v. State, 354 S.E.2d 144, 145 (Ga. 1987); Christian, 819 
S.E.2d at 686. 
 97. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excess fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 98. See, e.g., State v. Grazian, 164 P.3d 790, 797 (Idaho 2007), abrogated on other grounds by 265 
P.3d 502, (Colo. 2011) (“When reviewing a claim of cruel and unusual punishment the Court uses a 
proportionality analysis limited to cases which are out of proportion to the gravity of the offense 
committed. The Court compares the crime committed and the sentence imposed to determine 
whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate. This gross disproportionality test is equivalent to 
the standard under the Idaho Constitution which focuses on whether the punishment is so out of 
proportion to the gravity of the offense to shock the conscience of reasonable people. An ‘intra-and 
inter-jurisdictional analysis’ is ‘appropriate only in the rare case’ where the sentence is grossly 
disproportionate to the crime committed.” quoting State v. Matteson, 851 P.2d 336, 340 (Idaho 
1993)). 
 99. State v. Brown, 825 P.2d 482, 490–91 (Idaho 1992) (overruling reliance on Solem in State v. 
Broadhead, 814 P.2d 401, 408 (Idaho 1991)). 
 100. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
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Solem in Harmelin v. Michigan.101 As such, defendants typically lose cruel and 
unusual state constitutional law challenges in Idaho.102 
The “cruel and unusual” punishment provision in the New Mexico state 
constitution is identical to the Eighth Amendment. 103  New Mexico has 
adopted an interstitial approach to interpreting its state constitution in light of 
parallel federal provisions,104 but in practice has not found any reason to 
interpret its cruel and unusual punishment clause differently from the Eighth 
Amendment.105 
The New York Constitution contains language proscribing cruel and 
unusual punishments identical to the Eighth Amendment.106 New York courts 
have applied the Eighth Amendment’s gross disproportionality test and 
almost never find a punishment to be disproportionate.107 
With respect to cruel and unusual punishments, the Ohio Constitution 
uses identical language to the Eighth Amendment.108 The Ohio courts use a 
test of gross disproportionality when applying the state constitution to 
sentences,109 making most sentences constitutional.110 
 
 101. 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991). 
 102. See, e.g., State v. Adamcik, 272 P.3d 417, 459 (Idaho 2012); State v. Draper, 261 P.3d 853, 
879 (Idaho 2011); Grazian, 164 P.3d at 797; State v. Matteson, 851 P.2d 336, 341 (Idaho 1993); State 
v. Prince, 556 P.2d 369, 370 (Idaho 1976); Williams v. State, 283 P.3d 127, 141 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2012); State v. Thomas, 991 P.2d 870, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999); State v. Rogerson, 966 P.2d 53, 59 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1998); State v. Toney, 949 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Schneider, 888 P.2d 798, 804 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); State v. Moore, 906 P.2d 150, 154 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1995); State v. Clay, 859 P.2d 365, 368 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hayes, 824 P.2d 163, 
169 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992); State v. Romero, 753 P.2d 828, 830 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). 
 103. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”). 
 104. See State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997) (explaining that a state court adopting this 
approach may diverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal analysis, structural 
differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics); see also 
Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1358 
(1982) (explaining the interstitial approach). 
 105. See, e.g., State v. Castillo, 252 P.3d 760, 769 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Rueda, 975 
P.2d 351, 353–54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Arrington, 897 P.2d 241, 242 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 106. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 5 (“Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.”). 
 107. See, e.g., People v. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d 338, 346–47 (N.Y. 1975); People v. Goodwin, 870 
N.Y.S.2d 224, 224 (City Ct. of Poughkeepsie 2008). 
 108. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9 (“Excessive bail shall not be required; nor excessive fines imposed; 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 109. See McDougle v. Maxwell, 203 N.E.2d 334, 336–37 (Ohio 1964); see also State v. 
Smithhisler, 2017-Ohio-5725, at ¶ 29, 93 N.E.3d 1274, 1280 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017); State v. Thomas, 
2002-Ohio-7333U, at ¶ 32, on reconsideration, 2009-Ohio-971, at ¶¶ 30–31, vacated, 2010-Ohio-577, at 
¶¶ 30–31, 124 Ohio St. 3d 412, 922 N.E.2d 964. 
 110. See, e.g., Coleman v. DeWitt, 282 F.3d 915, 915 (6th Cir. 2002); State v. Nitsche, 2016-
Ohio-3170, at ¶ 63, 66 N.E.3d 135, 153; State v. Dukes, 2015-Ohio-4714, at ¶¶ 32–35, 49 N.E.3d 
840, 847; State v. Mayberry, 2014-Ohio-4706, at ¶ 38, 22 N.E.3d 222, 232–33; State v. Manhart, 
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The Tennessee Constitution contains identical language to the Eighth 
Amendment in its analogue.111 Although Tennessee courts have noted that the 
textual parallels between the federal and state constitution’s proscriptions 
against cruel and unusual punishments do not foreclose a broader reading of 
the state constitution, 112  Tennessee courts have, in practice, 113  generally 
followed the Eighth Amendment’s gross disproportionality test in non-capital 
cases and upheld most sentences.114 
Utah’s state constitutional Eighth Amendment analogue is almost 
identical—proscribing cruel and unusual punishments115 but also adding a 
unique provision that prohibits treating persons arrested or imprisoned “with 
unnecessary rigor.”116 In applying these provisions, Utah courts generally track 
the Eighth Amendment and use the gross disproportionality test, finding most 
punishments to be constitutional.117 
The Virginia Constitution uses identical language to the Eighth 
Amendment. 118 As such, Virginia courts use the same test as the Eighth 
Amendment.119 
Wisconsin’s state constitution uses identical language to the Eighth 
Amendment.120 Wisconsin follows the Eighth Amendment—as the scope of 
 
734 N.E.2d 860, 863 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); State v. Garland, 688 N.E.2d 557, 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1996). 
 111. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“That excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 112. State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 188 (Tenn. 1991). 
 113. State v. Harris, 844 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tenn. 1992); Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765, 
767 (Tenn. 1979). 
 114. See, e.g., Harris, 844 S.W.2d at 603; State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159, 173 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
2000); State v. McKee, 803 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990); State v. Dobbins, 754 
S.W.2d 637, 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). 
 115. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 9 (“Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be 
imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall 
not be treated with unnecessary rigor.”). 
 116. Id. The Utah courts have, to date, only applied this to conditions of incarceration. See, e.g., 
State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 50–51, 353 P.3d 55, 72. 
 117. See, e.g., Houston, 2015 UT at ¶¶ 50–51, 353 P.3d at 72; State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 
¶¶ 74–77, 20 P.3d 342, 365–66; State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 49, 993 P.2d 854, 867; State v. 
Andrews, 843 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1992); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 272 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1343–44 (Utah 1984); State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, ¶ 18, 113 P.3d 
992, 997; State v. Wanlass, 953 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
 118. VA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted . . . .”). 
 119. See, e.g., Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 663 S.E.2d 117, 133 (Va. Ct. App. 2008); Dep’t of 
Prof’l & Occupational Regulation, Bd. for Asbestos & Lead v. Abateco Servs., Inc., 534 S.E.2d 352, 
357 (Va. Ct. App. 2000). 
 120. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
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the state constitution is identical to that of the Eighth Amendment.121 As such, 
Wisconsin courts reject most claims under the gross disproportionality test.122 
b. Identical Language Plus a Proportionality Requirement (Indiana, Maine, 
and New Hampshire) 
Indiana’s state constitutional analogue to the Eighth Amendment is 
conjunctive, but it also adds a separate provision explicitly requiring 
punishments to be proportional to the nature of the offense.123 Nonetheless, 
Indiana courts have held that the protections under the state constitution and 
the Eighth Amendment are the same.124 Unsurprisingly, Indiana courts apply 
the state constitution narrowly, typically upholding challenged 
punishments.125 
The Maine Constitution uses similar conjunctive language to that of the 
Eighth Amendment but also includes a proportionality requirement.126 The 
Maine Supreme Court explained that “under the Maine Constitution, 
whether a punishment is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the offense 
committed or is otherwise cruel or unusual are closely related, but not 
identical, questions.”127 The Maine Supreme Court has established a two-part 
test to correspond to the two separate provisions: the court first looks to 
whether the penalty is greatly disproportionate, and then if not, it looks to 
 
 121. See, e.g., State v. Pratt, 153 N.W.2d 18, 22–23 (Wis. 1967). 
 122. See, e.g., State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶¶ 97–98, 797 N.W.2d 451, 478; State v. Paske, 471 
N.W.2d 55, 63 (Wis. 1991); Steeno v. State, 271 N.W.2d 396, 401 (Wis. 1978); Pratt, 153 N.W.2d at 
23; State v. Lindsey, 554 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Teynor, 414 N.W.2d 76, 
88 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). 
 123. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (“Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be 
imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to 
the nature of the offense.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 879 (Ind. 2012). 
 125. See, e.g., Conley, 972 N.E.2d at 880; Dunlop v. State, 724 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ind. 2000); 
Eubank v. State, 456 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (Ind. 1983); Kelly v. State, 452 N.E.2d 907, 912 (Ind. 1983); 
Johnson v. State, 432 N.E.2d 1358, 1362 (Ind. 1982); Marts v. State, 432 N.E.2d 18, 22 (Ind. 1982); 
Stuck v. State, 421 N.E.2d 622, 625 (Ind. 1981); Fryback v. State, 400 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (Ind. 
1980); Jennings v. State, 389 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ind. 1979); Phelps v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1009, 1021 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012); Newkirk v. State, 898 N.E.2d 473, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). But see Fointno 
v. State, 487 N.E.2d 140, 149 (Ind. 1986) (finding a sentence of imprisonment of 104 years for 
defendant convicted of rape, criminal deviate conduct, confinement, robbery, and intimidation was 
manifestly unreasonable). 
 126. ME. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“Sanguinary laws shall not be passed: all penalties and punishments 
shall be proportioned to the offense; excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 127. State v. Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶¶ 14–15, 184 A.3d 880, 885; see also State v. Ward, 2011 ME 
74, ¶¶ 16–17, 21 A.3d 1033, 1038. 
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whether it offends the prevailing notions of decency.128 If a sentence fails 
either test, it is unconstitutional.129 
When applying the greatly disproportionate part of the test, the court 
largely tracks the analysis under the Eighth Amendment. First, the court 
assesses the disproportionality, and then compares the present case with other 
similar cases in Maine before doing so with cases in other jurisdictions.130 The 
prevailing notions of decency test simply looks to see whether one or more 
purposes of punishment justify the sentence.131 The consequence of adopting 
the two-part test has been that most sentences satisfy both tests and are 
upheld.132 
New Hampshire uses identical language to the U.S. Constitution in its 
Eighth Amendment state constitution analogue.133 Their state constitution 
also contains a separate provision that explicitly requires proportionality in 
criminal sentencing in light of the purposes of punishment.134 According to its 
courts, New Hampshire “provides at least as much” protection under the state 
constitution as the Eighth Amendment does.135 Nonetheless, New Hampshire 
courts use a gross disproportionality test similar to that applied by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, meaning that most punishments are found constitutional.136 
 
 128. Lopez, 2018 ME at ¶¶ 14–15, 184 A.3d at 885; Ward, 2011 ME at ¶¶ 17–18, 21 A.3d at 1038. 
 129. Lopez, 2018 ME at ¶¶ 14–15, 184 A.3d at 885; Ward, 2011 ME at ¶ 18, 21 A.3d at 1038 n.4; 
State v. Frye, 390 A.2d 520, 521 (Me. 1978). 
 130. Lopez, 2018 ME at ¶¶ 15–17, 184 A.3d at 886; State v. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43, ¶¶ 28–29, 65 
A.3d 1242, 1251. 
 131. Lopez, 2018 ME at ¶ 17, 184 A.3d at 887; Stanislaw, 2013 ME at ¶ 50, 65 A.3d at 1257. 
 132. See, e.g., Lopez, 2018 ME at ¶ 21, 184 A.3d at 887; State v. Hoover, 2017 ME 158, ¶ 40, 169 
A.3d 904, 913; State v. Bennett, 2015 ME 46, ¶ 15, 114 A.3d 994, 1000; Ward, 2011 ME at ¶ 20, 21 
A.3d at 1038; State v. Worthley, 2003 ME 14, ¶ 7, 815 A.2d 375, 377. But see Stanislaw, 2013 ME at 
¶ 50, 65 A.3d at 1257 (finding “a sentence that included twenty-seven unsuspended years of 
incarceration” disproportionate). 
 133. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 33 (“No magistrate, or court of law, shall demand excessive bail or 
sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments.”). 
 134. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 18 (“All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the 
offense. No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery, and the 
like, which they do to those of murder and treason; where the same undistinguishing severity is 
exerted against all offenses, the people are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, 
and to commit the most flagrant with as little compunction as they do the lightest offenses: For the 
same reason a multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The true design of all 
punishments being to reform, not to exterminate mankind.”). 
 135. State v. Dayutis, 498 A.2d 325, 329 (N.H. 1985). 
 136. See, e.g., State v. Carpentino, 85 A.3d 906, 917 (N.H. 2014); State v. Bird, 8 A.3d 146, 154 
(N.H. 2010); Duquette v. Warden, N. H. State Prison, 919 A.2d 767, 774 (N.H. 2007); State v. 
Enderson, 804 A.2d 448, 454 (N.H. 2002); State v. Hammond, 742 A.2d 532, 539 (N.H. 1999); 
State v. Elbert, 480 A.2d 854, 862 (N.H. 1984). But see Dayutis, 498 A.2d at 329 (holding that "the 
sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum term of thirty-five years is disproportionate to the 
offense of second degree murder" under the applicable statute). 
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c. Identical Language Plus a Citation to the Eighth Amendment (Florida) 
Florida’s constitutional analogue to the Eighth Amendment proscribes 
cruel and unusual punishments, but goes further and specifically links the 
language to the Eighth Amendment itself.137 The 1998 amendment to this 
provision changed the conjunction from “or” to “and.”138 As a result, the 
current provision provides that for both “and” and “or,” the meaning of the 
constitutional proscription “shall be construed in conformity with decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court” in applying the Eighth Amendment.139 As with the 
Eighth Amendment, Florida courts have uniformly upheld punishments in 
non-homicide cases under the state constitution,140 with the exception of cases 
falling under the Supreme Court’s JLWOP categorical exceptions.141 
d. Identical Language Plus “Excessive” (Louisiana) 
Louisiana’s state constitutional analogue prohibits the imposition of a 
“cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.”142 Louisiana courts have applied a 
gross disproportionality test under the state constitution, using similar 
language to the Eighth Amendment cases. 143 According to the Louisiana 
courts, the term excessive in the state constitution is synonymous with gross 
 
 137. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (“Excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment, attainder, 
forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden. 
The death penalty is an authorized punishment for capital crimes designated by the legislature. The 
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, shall be construed in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
which interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .”). 
 138. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17 (amended 1998). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 797 (Fla. 2010); Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746, 
753 (Fla. 2005); Jackson v. State, 241 So. 3d 914, 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); Rogers v. State, 96 
So. 3d 922, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Andrews v. State, 82 So. 3d 979, 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2011); Paey v. State, 943 So. 2d 919, 927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Morrow v. State, 856 So. 2d 
1043, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 141. See, e.g., Gridine v. State, 175 So. 3d 672, 673 (Fla. 2015); Hawkins v. State, 219 So. 3d 982, 
984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
 142. LA. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“No law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to 
cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment. Full rights of citizenship shall be restored upon termination 
of state and federal supervision following conviction for any offense.”). 
 143. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 43,227, p. 13 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/11/08); 987 So. 2d 330, 338 (“A 
sentence violates LA. CONST. art. 1, § 20 if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the 
offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence 
is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the 
harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice.” (internal citations omitted)); see also State v. 
Smith, 2001-2574, pp. 2–4 (La. 1/14/03); 839 So. 2d 1, 4; State v. Weaver, 2001-0467, p. 11 (La. 
1/15/02); 805 So. 2d 166, 174; State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276, 1280 (La. 1993); State v. Lobato, 
603 So. 2d 739, 751 (La. 1992); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355, 358 (La. 1980); State v. Robinson, 
40,983, p. 3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/24/07); 948 So. 2d 379, 381; State v. Bradford, 29,519, p. 3 (La. App. 
2 Cir. 4/2/97); 691 So. 2d 864. 
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disproportionality.144 As such, Louisiana courts have typically rejected state 
constitutional cruel punishment claims.145 
e. Identical Language Plus a Dignity Requirement (Montana) 
Montana uses identical language to the Eighth Amendment in its 
analogue.146 The state constitution, however, contains an additional provision 
that guarantees protection of individual dignity.147 The Montana courts read 
these provisions together to provide broader protection from cruel and 
unusual punishments than that given by the Eighth Amendment.148 
The protection of offender dignity, though, primarily pertains to prison 
conditions, not duration of punishment.149 As such, Montana courts use the 
Eighth Amendment’s gross disproportionality test in applying the state 
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments, almost 
never reversing sentences.150 
 
 144. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 99-296, p. 12 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/99); 740 So. 2d 216, 223; State 
v. Bowers, 99-416, p. 4 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/28/99); 746 So. 2d 82, 85; State v. Zeno, 99–69, p. 17 (La. 
App. 5 Cir. 8/31/99); 742 So. 2d 699, 711; State v. Alexander, 989–993, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 
3/10/99); 734 So. 2d 43, 46. 
 145. See, e.g., State v. Stetson, 317 So. 2d 172, 176–77 (La. 1975);  State v. Miller, 269 So. 2d 829, 
830 (La. 1972);  State v. Crook, 221 So. 2d 473, 476 (La. 1969); Howard, 987 So. 2d at 338–39. But 
see State v. Dixon, 18-79, pp. 14 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/29/18); 254 So. 3d 828, 840–41 (finding 
disproportionate a sentence of ninety-nine years without parole for sexual battery of a juvenile under 
the age of thirteen). 
 146. MONT. CONST. art. II § 22 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, or excessive fines 
imposed, or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 147. MONT. CONST. art. II § 4 (“The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall 
be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or 
institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on 
account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, ¶ 73, 316 Mont. 103, 120–21, 68 P.3d 872, 883. 
 149. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 75–76, 316 Mont. at 120–21, 68 P.3d at 883. 
 150. See, e.g., State v. Paulsrud, 2012 MT 180, ¶¶ 8, 19, 366 Mont. 62, 66–67, 285 P.3d 505, 508; 
State v. Rickman, 2008 MT 142, ¶¶ 15–16, 18, 343 Mont. 120, 122–24, 183 P.3d 49, 52–53; State v. 
Shults, 2006 MT 100, ¶ 30, 332 Mont. 130, 137–38, 136 P.3d 507, 513; State v. Wardell, 2005 MT 
252, ¶ 28, 329 Mont. 9, 15–16, 122 P.3d 443, 448; State v. Webb, 2005 MT 5, ¶¶ 18, 32–34, 325 
Mont. 317, 326–27, 106 P.3d 521, 526, 529–30; State v. Johnson, 2002 MT 251, ¶¶ 14–15, 17–20, 312 
Mont. 164, 167–68, 58 P.3d 172, 174–75, rev’d on other grounds, State v. Herman, 2008 MT 187, 343 
Mont. 494, 188 P.3d 978; State v. DeSalvo, 903 P.2d 202, 206–07 (Mont. 1995), rev’d on other 
grounds, State v. Herman, 2008 MT 187, 188 P.3d 978; State v. Peck, 865 P.2d 304, 306 (Mont. 
1993); State v. Dahms, 825 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Mont. 1992), modified, City of Billings v. Bruce, 965 
P.2d 866 (Mont. 1998); State ex rel. Majerus v. Carter, 693 P.2d 501, 505 (Mont. 1984); State v. 
Bruns, 691 P.2d 817, 820–21 (Mont. 1984); State v. Watson, 686 P.2d 879, 889, 891 (Mont. 1984); 
State v. Kirkland, 602 P.2d 586, 595 (Mont. 1979); State v. Maldonado, 578 P.2d 296, 304–05 
(Mont. 1978).  
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f. Identical Language but a Singular Punishment (Iowa, Missouri, and 
Nebraska) 
Iowa uses language identical to the Eighth Amendment in its state 
constitutional analogue, except the word “punishment” is singular, not 
plural. 151  Iowa courts look to the Eighth Amendment for guidance in 
interpreting the state provision. 152  As such, the application of the state 
constitution by Iowa courts generally falls within the scope defined by the 
Supreme Court, severely limiting relief in non-capital cases.153 Iowa courts 
have explored expanding the scope of protections for juvenile offenders 
within, but not beyond, the framework the U.S. Supreme Court established 
under the Eighth Amendment.154 
Missouri’s Eighth Amendment analogue is conjunctive and proscribes 
the infliction of a cruel and unusual punishment.155 Missouri courts interpret 
this provision as essentially identical to the Eighth Amendment.156 Missouri 
courts apply the gross disproportionality test,157 meaning litigants virtually 
never succeed under the state constitution’s cruel and unusual punishment 
clause.158 
Nebraska’s Eighth Amendment analogue is conjunctive and bars the 
infliction of a cruel and unusual punishment.159 Nebraska courts have held that 
 
 151. IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 17 (“Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be 
imposed, and cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.”). 
 152. See, e.g., State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 188–91 (Iowa 2018); State v. Musser, 721 
N.W.2d 734, 748–49 (Iowa 2006); State v. Ramirez, 597 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1999), overruled on 
other grounds by 773 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).  
 153. See, e.g., Wessling v. Bennett, 410 F.2d 205, 207 (8th Cir. 1969); State v. Wickes, 910 
N.W.2d 554, 572–75 (Iowa 2018); State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 98–104 (Iowa 2017); State v. 
Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 639–53 (Iowa 2012); State v. Nims, 357 N.W.2d 608, 610–11 (Iowa 1984); 
State v. Jones, 298 N.W.2d 296, 299–300 (Iowa 1980); State v. McNeal, 167 N.W.2d 674, 78 (Iowa 
1969); State v. Di Paglia, 71 N.W.2d 601, 604–05 (Iowa 1955); State v. Jorgensen, 785 N.W.2d 708, 
712–13 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). 
 154. See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 386–403 (Iowa 2014). 
 155. MO. CONST. art. I, § 21 (“That excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”). 
 156. See, e.g., State v. Pribble, 285 S.W.3d 310, 313–14 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); State v. Lee, 841 
S.W.2d 648, 654 (Mo. 1992) (en banc); State v. Bell, 719 S.W.2d 763, 766–67 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). 
 157. See, e.g., Pribble, 285 S.W.3d at 314; Lee, 841 S.W.2d at 654; Bell, 719 S.W.2d 763 at 766. 
 158. See, e.g., Pribble, 285 S.W.3d at 314; Lee, 841 S.W.2d at 654–55; Bell, 719 S.W.2d at 766–67; 
State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 126 (Mo. 1981); State v. Wishom, 416 S.W.2d 921, 927 (Mo. 
1967); State v. Bolds, 11 S.W.3d 633, 636–67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Graham, 906 S.W.2d 
771, 783–84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), mandate vacated on other grounds, 969 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1998); State v. Nixon, 858 S.W.2d 782, 788 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Katura, 837 S.W.2d 547, 
551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Whitehead, 675 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. 
Bailey, 659 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Boley, 565 S.W.2d 828, 832 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1978); State v. Gaye, 532 S.W.2d 783, 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.2d 
557, 595–96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). 
 159. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”). 
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the state constitutional punishment provision does not require more than the 
Eighth Amendment.160 Generally, Nebraska defendants are unable to establish 
that their sentences are grossly disproportionate.161 Nevertheless, Nebraska 
courts have held that electrocutions are unconstitutional punishments under 
the state constitution.162 
2.  Adopting a Separate State Constitutional Approach 
The following states have created their own approach. Some approaches 
incorporate ideas from the Eighth Amendment cases, but the inquiry is 
unique and different from the one established under the U.S. Constitution. 
a. Identical Language Plus Purposes of Punishment (Alaska) 
Alaska applies its own state constitutional test163 independent of the 
Eighth Amendment.164 Part of the difference stems from a second sentence in 
Alaska’s state constitutional provision that requires criminal sentences to be 
based on the various purposes of punishment.165 The Alaska test, which is the 
same for cruel and unusual punishments and violations of state substantive 
due process, states: 
Only those punishments which are cruel and unusual in the sense that 
they are inhuman or barbarous, or so disproportionate to the offense 
committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of 
 
 160. See, e.g., Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 922 (D. Neb. 2010); State v. Hurbenca, 669 
N.W.2d 668, 675 (Neb. 2003); State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 95 (Neb. 1999). 
 161. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 900 N.W.2d 757, 764 (Neb. 2017); State v. Johnson, 859 N.W.2d 
877, 886 (Neb. 2015); State v. Golka, 796 N.W.2d 198, 216 (Neb. 2011); State v. Robinson, 769 
N.W.2d 366, 378 (Neb. 2009); Hurbenca, 669 N.W.2d at 677; State v. Brand, 363 N.W.2d 516, 520 
(Neb. 1985); State v. Ruzicka, 357 N.W.2d 457, 461–62 (Neb. 1984), abrogated by 745 N.W.2d 229 
(Iowa 2008); State v. Tucker, 162 N.W.2d 774, 775–76 (Neb. 1968), abrogated by 745 N.W.2d 229 
(Iowa 2008). 
 162. State v. Sandoval, 788 N.W.2d 172, 224 (Neb. 2010). 
 163. ALASKA CONST. art I, § 12. 
 164. See, e.g., Burnor v. State, 829 P.2d 837, 839–40 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Dancer v. State, 715 
P.2d 1174, 1177 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
 165. ALASKA CONST. art I, § 12 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Criminal administration shall be based upon 
the following: the need for protecting the public, community condemnation of the offender, the 
rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the offender, and the principle of reformation.”). The 
Alaska courts seem to cherry pick from these purposes rather than choosing one over the other. See, 
e.g., Smith v. State, 691 P.2d 293, 295 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that, although the court 
must in each instance consider permissible sentencing goals, it is the court’s prerogative to decide the 
weight and order in priority to give each goal based on circumstances of the individual case and that 
the  sentencing court is not required to give priority to rehabilitation in imposing a sentence). Such 
an approach is common to such provisions, even though the consequence of choosing one purpose of 
punishment over another might be a different criminal sentence. See William W. Berry III, Discretion 
Without Guidance, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 650–51 (2008). 
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justice may be stricken as violating the due process [and cruel and 
unusual punishment] clauses.166 
Alaska courts distinguish this test from the Eighth Amendment test used by 
the Supreme Court167 and use it to strike down excessive sentences more often 
than the Supreme Court has done so.168 The approach taken by the Alaska 
Supreme Court in these cases has simply been to assess whether, based on the 
facts, the sentence was excessive in the sense that it was disproportionate by 
not satisfying one or more of the purposes of punishment.169 
b. Identical Language Plus a Death Penalty Rule (New Jersey) 
New Jersey’s state constitutional analogue to the Eighth Amendment is 
conjunctive, proscribing cruel and unusual punishments.170 New Jersey courts 
have adopted a three-part test to assess the constitutionality of a punishment 
under the New Jersey Constitution, which is essentially a hybrid of the Eighth 
Amendment’s evolving standards of decency and gross disproportionality 
tests. 171  Despite the New Jersey courts’ examination of contemporary 
standards and penological goals, the courts have typically upheld punishments 
challenged under the state constitution.172 
 
 166. Green v. State, 390 P.2d 433, 435 (Alaska 1964); see also Moore v. State, 262 P.3d 217, 222 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2011); McNabb v. State, 860 P.2d 1294, 1298–99 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). 
 167. Dancer, 715 P.2d at 1180. 
 168. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 622 P.2d 432, 440 (Alaska 1981); Wharton v. State, 590 P.2d 427, 
430 (Alaska 1979); Hansen v. State, 582 P.2d 1041, 1045–46 (Alaska 1978); Szeratics v. State, 572 
P.2d 63, 67 (1977); Black v. State, 569 P.2d 804, 805 (1977); Huff v. State, 568 P.2d 1014, 1020 
(Alaska 1977); Mattern v. State, 500 P.2d 228, 234 (Alaska 1972); Galaktionoff v. State, 486 P.2d 
919, 923 (Alaska 1971); Yu v. State, 706 P.2d 348, 349 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Husted v. State, 629 
P.2d 985, 986–87 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981). 
 169. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (listing Alaska cases where the court reversed the 
sentence for being excessive). 
 170. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 12 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not 
be imposed, and cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. It shall not be cruel and 
unusual punishment to impose the death penalty on a person convicted of purposely or knowingly 
causing death or purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury resulting in death who 
committed the homicidal act by his own conduct or who as an accomplice procured the commission of 
the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value.”). New Jersey 
legislatively abolished the death penalty in 1997. See State and Federal Info New Jersey, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-jersey-1 [https://perma.cc/5HQV-X85Y]. 
 171. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 766 A.2d 1126, 1140 (N.J. 2001) (“We consider, first, whether the 
punishment conforms with contemporary standards of decency; second, whether the punishment is 
grossly disproportionate to the offense; and third, whether the punishment goes beyond what is 
necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective.”); State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 
1175 (N.J. 1994). 
 172. See, e.g., State v. Josephs, 803 A.2d 1074, 1130 (N.J. 2002); Johnson, 766 A.2d at 1140; State 
v. Des Marets, 455 A.2d 1074, 1084 (N.J. 1983); State v. DeAngelis, 747 A.2d 289, 295 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2000); State v. Nunez, 620 A.2d 1061, 1064 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); State v. 
Oliver, 689 A.2d 876, 882–83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).  
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c. Identical Language Plus a Proportionality Requirement (Oregon and West 
Virginia) 
Like the Eighth Amendment, the Oregon Constitution proscribes “cruel 
and unusual” punishments, but it also adds a requirement that all penalties be 
proportional to the offense.173 Oregon courts interpret the proportionality and 
cruel and unusual punishment provisions separately, although each can inform 
the interpretation of the other. 174 The application of Oregon’s cruel and 
unusual punishment provision mirrors that of the Eighth Amendment, 
requiring gross disproportionality for the punishment to be 
unconstitutional.175 
In assessing proportionality under the state constitution, Oregon courts 
ask whether the sentence would “shock[] the moral sense” of reasonable 
people.176 In making this determination, Oregon courts weigh three factors: 
“(1) a comparison of the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime; 
(2) a comparison of the penalties imposed for other, related crimes; and (3) 
the criminal history of the defendant.”177 Although typically unsuccessful,178 
appeals relying on the application of this proportionality test have resulted in 
the reversal of sentences in a few cases under the state constitution.179 
The West Virginia Constitution employs identical language to the 
Eighth Amendment but also contains a separate proportionality 
requirement.180 West Virginia courts apply this state constitutional test in two 
parts, first assessing whether the sentence is subjectively disproportionate in 
 
 173. OR. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed. 
Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, but all penalties shall be proportioned to the 
offense.”). 
 174. See, e.g., State v. Althouse, 375 P.3d 475, 484 (Or. 2016); State v. Wheeler, 175 P.3d 438, 
446 (Or. 2007). 
 175. See, e.g., State v. Simonson, 259 P.3d 962, 965 (Or. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Ronniger, 492 
P.2d 298, 304 (Or. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Hecket, 467 P.2d 122, 123 (Or. Ct. App. 1970), cert. 
denied sub. nom., Wade v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 972 (1972). 
 176. See, e.g., Althouse, 375 P.3d at 484; State v. Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308, 1323 (Or. 1992); State v. 
Padilla, 371 P.3d 1242, 1244 (Or. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Pardee, 215 P.3d 870, 872 (Or. Ct. App. 
2009). 
 177. State v. Rodriguez, 217 P.3d 659, 668 (Or. 2009); see also Padilla, 371 P.3d at 1243; 
Simonson, 259 P.3d at 965. 
 178. See, e.g., State v. Burgert, 423 P.3d 169, 170 (Or. Ct. App. 2018); State v. Horseman, 432 
P.3d 258, 265 (Or. Ct. App. 2018), review denied, 441 P.3d 1165 (Or. 2019); State v. Smith, 372 P.3d 
549, 557 (Or. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Johnson, 260 P.3d 782, 786–87 (Or. Ct. App. 2011). 
 179. See, e.g., State v. Ryan, 396 P.3d 867, 884 (Or. 2017); State v. Davidson, 380 P.3d 963, 
974–75, 975–76 (Or. 2016); Rodriguez, 217 P.3d at 668; State v. Carey-Martin, 430 P.3d 98, 133–34 
(Or. Ct. App. 2018) (en banc). 
 180. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. Penalties shall be proportioned to the character 
and degree of the offence. No person shall be transported out of, or forced to leave the state for any 
offence committed within the same; nor shall any person, in any criminal case, be compelled to be a 
witness against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offence.”). 
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that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human 
dignity, much like the Eighth Amendment’s gross disproportionality test.181 
The second test, which the courts apply if the sentence survives the first test, 
applies an objective assessment of proportionality that requires the court to 
consider (1) “the nature of the offense,” (2) “the legislative purpose behind the 
punishment,” (3) how the punishment compares “with what would be inflicted 
in other jurisdictions,” and (4) how the punishment compares to the 
punishments of “other related offenses within the same jurisdiction.”182 Most 
punishments survive both tests,183 but the West Virginia courts have reversed 
a significant number of cases under its state constitutional proportionality 
principle.184 
B. Cruel “OR” Unusual 
A number of states have an Eighth Amendment analogue in their 
constitutions that use a different conjunction from the federal amendment. 
These states have constitutions that bar cruel “or” unusual punishments. In 
theory, this would allow the state supreme courts to proscribe “cruel” 
punishments, irrespective of their unusualness. Most of these jurisdictions, 
however, have ignored the difference between “or” and “and” by blindly 
adopting the Eighth Amendment approach. 
1.  Adopting the Eighth Amendment Approach 
a. Identical Disjunctive Language (Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming) 
Alabama’s provision states: “That excessive fines shall not be imposed, 
nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.”185 With respect to non-homicide 
crimes, Alabama courts have used the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
gross disproportionality test in interpreting the Alabama Constitution’s 
 
 181. State v. Shafer, 789 S.E.2d 153, 159 (W. Va. 2015); State v. Mann, 518 S.E.2d 60, 71–72 
(W. Va. 1999); State v. Cooper, 304 S.E.2d 851, 857 (W. Va. 1983). 
 182. Shafer, 789 S.E.2d at 159; State v. Cook, 723 S.E.2d 388, 397 (W. Va. 2010); Wanstreet v. 
Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205, 214 (W. Va. 1981); Martin v. Leverette, 244 S.E.2d 39, 43 (W. Va. 
1978). 
 183. See, e.g., State v. Blevins, 744 S.E.2d 245, 268 (W. Va. 2013); State v. Woodson, 671 S.E.2d 
438, 451 (W. Va. 2008); State v. Adams, 565 S.E.2d 353, 357 (W. Va. 2002); State ex rel. Appleby v. 
Recht, 583 S.E.2d 800, 811 (W. Va. 2002); State v. Farr, 456 S.E.2d 199, 202 (W. Va. 1995); State v. 
King, 518 S.E.2d 663, 669–71 (W. Va. 1995). 
 184. See, e.g., State v. Kilmer, 808 S.E.2d 867, 870–71 (W. Va. 2017); State v. Wilson, No. 11-
0432, 2012 WL 3031065, at *2 (W. Va. Mar. 12, 2012); State v. David D. W., 588 S.E.2d 156, 165–
66 (W. Va. 2003); State v. Miller, 400 S.E.2d 897, 900–01 (W Va. 1990); Wanstreet v. 
Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205, 214 (W. Va. 1981). 
 185. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
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analogue to the Eighth Amendment.186 Alabama courts have also uniformly 
upheld the death penalty under the state constitution,187 including the judicial 
override provision that was only recently abandoned.188 
The Arkansas Constitution’s analogue to the Eighth Amendment uses 
“or” as its conjunction.189 Under Arkansas law, a state appellate court generally 
may not overturn a sentence imposed within legislative limits, even if unduly 
harsh.190 The Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted the provisions in both 
the state and federal constitutions “identically on the issue of the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.”191 Even so, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court has indicated that there are three “extremely narrow” exceptions to this 
approach: “(1) where the punishment resulted from passion or prejudice, (2) 
where it was a clear abuse of the jury’s discretion, or (3) where it was so 
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral 
sense of the community.”192 
Hawaii’s constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel “or” unusual 
punishments. 193  Hawaii courts, however, have found the difference in 
conjunction between the Hawaii Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to 
be without significance because the intent of the drafters of the state 
constitution was to copy the U.S. Constitution. 194  As such, Hawaii has 
 
 186. See, e.g., Lane v. State, 66 So. 3d 830, 831 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (recognizing the Eighth 
Amendment proportionality principle); Wilson v. State, 830 So. 2d 765, 777–78 (Ala. Crim. App. 
2001) (same); Eldridge v. State, 418 So. 2d 203, 207 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); Cabble v. State, 347 
So. 2d 546, 548–49 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, 347 So. 2d 551 (Ala. 1977); Parnell v. State, 
49 So. 2d 919, 920 (Ala. Ct. App. 1950). 
 187. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 84 So. 3d 968, 995 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 84 So. 
3d 1013, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 829 (affirming the constitutionality of the judicial override). 
 188. There are serious questions, particularly after Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016), 
concerning whether the judicial override violated the Sixth Amendment. See generally Carissa Byrne 
Hessick & William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing after Hurst, 66 UCLA L. REV. 448 
(2019) (arguing that Hurst opens the door to a broader application of the Sixth Amendment). 
 189. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be 
imposed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be inflicted; nor witnesses be unreasonably 
detained.”). 
 190. See Bunch v. State, 43 S.W.3d 132, 138 (Ark. 2001); Williams v. State, 930 S.W.2d 297, 
301 (Ark. 1996); Parker v. State, 790 S.W.2d 894, 895 (Ark. 1990). 
 191. Bunch, 43 S.W.3d at 138. 
 192. Steele v. State, 434 S.W.3d 424, 431 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014); see also Williams v. State, 898 
S.W.2d 38, 39 (Ark. 1995); Dunlap v. State, 795 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Ark. 1990); Parker, 790 S.W.2d at 
895. It does not appear that Arkansas has ever found a case to be an exception to this rule. 
 193. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. The court may dispense with bail if reasonably 
satisfied that the defendant or witness will appear when directed, except for a defendant charged with 
an offense punishable by life imprisonment.”). 
 194. State v. Kido, 654 P.2d 1351, 1353 n.3 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (“The difference, however, 
appears to be only one of form and not of substance. When the Hawaii provision was originally 
adopted, the delegates to the 1950 constitutional convention used the eighth amendment to the 
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adopted the Eighth Amendment approach to assessing non-capital sentences, 
affirming them unless they are so disproportionate as to shock the 
conscience.195 The courts of Hawaii have uniformly upheld such challenges 
under the state constitution.196 
The Kansas Constitution contains a disjunctive Eighth Amendment 
analogue.197 Kansas courts have determined that because the language in the 
state constitution and the Eighth Amendment are similar, they should be 
construed similarly.198 In assessing a punishment under the state constitution, 
Kansas courts apply the Eighth Amendment concept of gross 
disproportionality199 and use the same three-part inquiry that other states use 
in this vein.200 Similarly to litigants under the Eighth Amendment, litigants 
rarely prevail under this standard.201 
The Massachusetts Constitution contains a disjunctive Eighth 
Amendment analogue.202 Even so, Massachusetts courts use a similar three-
part test to determine constitutionality: nature of offender and offense in light 
 
United States Constitution as a model and intended federal precedent to be followed in construing 
the state’s ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ clause.”). 
 195. See, e.g., State v. Solomon, 111 P.3d 12, 28 (Haw. 2005); State v. Jenkins, 997 P.2d 13, 40–
41 (Haw. 2000); State v. Davia, 953 P.2d 1347, 1356–57 (Haw. 1998); State v. Loa, 926 P.2d 1258, 
1279–80 (Haw. 1996); State v. Iaukea, 537 P.2d 724, 736 (Haw. 1975); Kido, 654 P.2d at 1360–61. 
 196. Davia, 953 P.2d at 1356. The Hawaii courts use the same three-pronged test for 
determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual, with the court to consider: “(1) the nature of 
the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger posed by both to 
society; (2) the extent of the challenged penalty as compared to the punishments prescribed for more 
serious crimes within the same jurisdiction; and (3) the extent of the challenged penalty as compared 
to the punishment prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions.” Id. 
 197. KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 9 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.”). 
 198. State v. Scott, 961 P.2d 667, 672–73 (Kan. 1998). 
 199. See State v. Weigel, 612 P.2d 636, 644–45 (Kan. 1980) (noting that the criteria which are to 
be considered in determining what is cruel or unusual punishment as to the length of a sentence 
include excessiveness, disproportionality, lack of necessity, unacceptability to society, and 
arbitrariness of infliction). 
 200. Kansas refers to these indicia as Freeman factors. See State v. Freeman, 574 P.2d 950 (1978). 
In its analysis, the court asks whether the purposes of punishment justify the sentence imposed, 
examine how the sentence compares to others sentenced in Kansas, and how it compares to sentences 
in other jurisdictions. Id. at 956; see, e.g., State v. Swint, 352 P.3d 1014, 1028–30 (Kan. 2015); State v. 
Britt, 287 P.3d 905, 916–18 (Kan. 2012); State v. Thomas, 199 P.3d 1265, 1267–68 (Kan. 2009). Like 
other jurisdictions, the Kansas courts also require something on the level of “shocking the 
conscience.” See, e.g., State v. Riffe, 418 P.3d 1278, 1291–92 (Kan. 2018); State v. Proctor, 280 P.3d 
839, 869 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d for further consideration (2013 Kan. LEXIS 587). 
 201. See, e.g., Swint, 352 P.3d at 1030; State v. Seward, 297 P.3d 272, 280–81 (Kan. 2013); Britt, 
287 P.3d at 916–18; State v. Mossman, 281 P.3d 153, 166 (Kan. 2012); State v. Woodard, 280 P.3d 
203, 209–10 (Kan. 2012); State v. Baber, 240 P.3d 980, 984–85 (Kan. 2010); State v. Spain, 4 P.3d 
621, 626 (Kan. 2000); State v. McDaniel, 612 P.2d 1231, 1239 (Kan. 1980); Davis v. State, 466 P.2d 
311, 316 (Kan. 1970); State v. Marion, 333 P.3d 194, 200–01 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014). 
 202. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI (“No magistrate or court of law, shall demand excessive bail 
or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments.”). 
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of degree of harm to society,  sentencing provisions in other jurisdictions for 
similar offenses,  and sentences for more severe offenses within the 
Commonwealth.203 In applying the gross disproportionality test, the state 
constitution mirrors the Eighth Amendment and requires that the punishment 
in question shock the conscience.204 Most punishments do not violate the state 
constitution.205 
Mississippi’s constitution bars the imposition of a “cruel or unusual 
punishment.”206 Mississippi courts do not give any effect to the disjunctive 
nature of the state constitution and instead simply apply the Eighth 
Amendment gross disproportionality test where the court finds an inference 
of disproportionality. 207  Not surprisingly, virtually all challenges to this 
provision fail.208 
Nevada uses the disjunctive prohibition against cruel or unusual 
punishments in its state constitutional Eighth Amendment analogue.209 Even 
so, Nevada courts use the basic Eighth Amendment gross proportionality 
doctrine to assess punishments under the state constitution,210 with defendants 
almost never prevailing.211 
 
 203. Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 596 N.E.2d 325, 330–31 (Mass. 1992), abrogated by 138 N.E.2d 
364 (Mass. 2020). 
 204. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 540 N.E.2d 1316, 1323–24 (Mass. 1989); Cepulonis v. 
Commonwealth, 427 N.E.2d 17, 19–21 (Mass. 1981); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166, 
173–74 (Mass. 1976). 
 205. See, e.g., Alvarez, 596 N.E.2d at 330–31; Commonwealth v. Tart, 557 N.E.2d 1123, 1135 
(Mass. 1990); Sanchez, 540 N.E.2d at 1323–24; Commonwealth v. Bianco, 454 N.E.2d 901, 905–06 
(Mass. 1983); Cepulonis, 427 N.E.2d at 19–21; Commonwealth v. Morrow, 296 N.E.2d 468, 476–77 
(Mass. 1973); Commonwealth v. Tirella, 249 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Mass. 1969); Commonwealth v. 
Derry, 522 N.E.2d 436, 437–38 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988). 
 206. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 28 (“Cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted, nor 
excessive fines be imposed.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Barnwell v. State, 567 So. 2d 215, 221–22 (Miss. 1990); Alston v. State, 2002-CA-
00555-COA (¶ 8), 841 So. 2d 215, 217 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003); Triplett v. State, 2002-KA-00015-
COA (¶¶ 18–21), 840 So. 2d 727, 732–33 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). 
 208. See, e.g., Nichols v. State, 2000-KA-00807-SCT (¶ 17), 826 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Miss. 2002); 
Bell v. State, 1999-KA-01686-SCT (¶¶ 23–32), 797 So. 2d 945, 950–51 (Miss. 2001); Braxton v. 
State, 1998-KA-01541-SCT (¶¶ 11–12), 797 So. 2d 826, 829 (Miss. 2000); Barnwell, 567 So. 2d at 
221–22; Whitley v. State, 511 So. 2d 929, 932 (Miss. 1987); McAdory v. State, 354 So. 2d 263, 266 
(Miss. 1978) overruled on other grounds by 372 So. 2d 257 (Miss. 1979); McCormick v. State, 279 So. 
2d 596, 599 (Miss. 1973), abrogated on other grounds 625 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1993); Ealy v. State, 262 
So. 2d 420, 421–22 (Miss. 1972); Williams v. State, 2008-KP-00227-COA (¶¶ 12–15), 24 So. 3d 360, 
365–66 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009); Alston, 2002-CA-00555-COA (¶ 8), 841 So. 2d at 217; Jefferson v. 
State, 2001-KA-01868-COA (¶¶ 9–10), 832 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); Womack v. 
State, 2000-KA-01428-COA (¶¶ 11–13), 827 So. 2d 55, 58–59 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). 
 209. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.”). 
 210. See, e.g., Blume v. State, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (Nev. 1996). 
 211. See, e.g., Farmer v. State, 405 P.3d 114, 125 (Nev. 2017); Mitchell v. State, No. 59749, 2013 
WL 5314891, at *4 (Nev. 2013); Chavez v. State, 213 P.3d 476, 489–90 (Nev. 2009); Blume, 915 P.2d 
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The North Carolina Constitution prohibits cruel “or” unusual 
punishments. 212  North Carolina courts, however, interpret the state 
constitution in an identical manner to the Eighth Amendment.213 The courts 
thus apply the gross disproportionality test, meaning defendants almost never 
prevail on their state constitutional cruel or unusual punishment claims.214 
North Dakota uses a disjunctive analogue to the Eighth Amendment in 
its state constitution, proscribing cruel “or” unusual punishments.215 The state 
courts of North Dakota have not issued any modern decisions giving guidance 
on the meaning of the disjunctive language in the state constitution.216 
Oklahoma’s constitutional analogue to the Eighth Amendment is 
disjunctive, banning cruel or unusual punishments. 217  The disjunctive 
conjunction is of no consequence under the decisions of the Oklahoma courts, 
which simply apply the Eighth Amendment gross disproportionality test,218 
meaning that defendants almost never prevail under the cruel or unusual 
punishments provision of the state constitution.219 
The Texas Constitution uses a disjunctive construction of cruel and 
unusual punishments, 220 but Texas courts interpret the state constitution 
 
282, 284 (Nev. 1996); Culverson v. State, 596 P.2d 220, 221–22 (Nev. 1979); Schmidt v. State, 584 
P.2d 695, 697 (Nev. 1978). 
 212. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 213. See, e.g., State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 611–12, 502 S.E.2d 819, 833–34 (1998). 
 214. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 346 N.C. 731, 738–39, 488 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1997); State v. 
Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 786, 309 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1983); State v. Stubbs, 232 N.C. App. 274, 285–
86, 754 S.E.2d 174, 182 (2014); State v. Pettigrew, 204 N.C. App. 248, 259, 693 S.E.2d 698, 705 
(2010); State v. Clifton, 158 N.C. App. 88, 94–96, 580 S.E.2d 40, 45–96 (2003); State v. Lee, 148 
N.C. App. 518, 524–25, 558 S.E.2d 883, 888 (2002); State v. Hinson, 102 N.C. App. 29, 37–38, 401 
S.E.2d 371, 376 (1991); State v. Norman, 100 N.C. App. 660, 663–64, 397 S.E.2d 647, 649 (1990). 
But see State v. Pemberton, 228 N.C. App. 234, 246–47, 743 S.E.2d 719, 728 (2013) (finding a 
JLWOP sentence to constitute cruel and unusual punishment). 
 215. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted.”). 
 216. Older cases have explained that “cruel” refers to the form of punishment and “unusual” 
refers to its frequency. See State v. Kingen, 226 N.W. 505, 506 (N.D. 1929) (quoting State v. Jochim, 
213 N.W. 485, 488 (N.D. 1927)). 
 217. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Applegate v. State, 904 P.2d 130, 135 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Dodd v. State, 879 
P.2d 822, 827 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 
 219. See, e.g., Randolph v. State, 2010 OK CR 2, ¶ 34, 231 P.3d 672, 683; Applegate, 904 P.2d at 
135; Dodd, 879 P.2d at 827; Lee v. State, 637 P.2d 879, 885 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981). 
 220. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.”). 
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identically to the Eighth Amendment.221 Consequently, cruel and unusual 
punishment claims typically fail under the Texas Constitution.222 
The Eighth Amendment analogue in the Wyoming Constitution is 
disjunctive and singular, proscribing the infliction of a cruel or unusual 
punishment. 223  Wyoming courts, however, appear to apply the Eighth 
Amendment test in applying the state constitution’s proscription against cruel 
or unusual punishment.224 
b. Disjunctive Language and Corporal Punishment (South Carolina) 
South Carolina’s analogue to the Eighth Amendment proscribes cruel 
punishment, corporal punishment, and unusual punishment.225 South Carolina 
courts have applied the Eighth Amendment’s gross disproportionality test to 
assess punishments under the state constitution, upholding virtually every 
sentence.226 
2.  Adopting a Separate State Constitutional Approach 
a. Combining Gross Disproportionality with Evolving Standards 
(California, Michigan, and Minnesota) 
California’s constitutional analogue to the Eighth Amendment uses “or” 
instead of “and.”227 California courts have explained that this distinction “is 
purposeful and substantive rather than merely semantic.”228 The courts thus 
 
 221. See, e.g., Randall v. State, 529 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. App. 2017); Reyes v. State, 557 
S.W.3d 624, 635 (Tex. App. 2017); Toledo, 519 S.W.3d 273, 284–86 (Tex. App. 2017). 
 222. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 323–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Chambers v. 
State, 601 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Toledo v. State, 519 S.W.3d 273, 286 (Tex. 
App. 2017); Woods v. State, 488 S.W.3d 809, 812–13 (Tex. App. 2016); Lopez v. State, 493 S.W.3d 
126, 139 (Tex. App. 2016); Pantoja v. State, 496 S.W.3d 186, 193–94 (Tex. App. 2016); Robertson v. 
State, 397 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Tex. App. 2013); Glover v. State, 406 S.W.3d 343, 350 (Tex. App. 
2013); Cienfuegos v. State, 113 S.W.3d 481, 496 (Tex. App. 2003); Atchison v. State, 124 S.W.3d 
755, 760 (Tex. App. 2003); Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. App. 1999); Phillips v. 
State, 887 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. App. 1994); Benjamin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 132, 134–35 (Tex. 
App. 1994); Swinney v. State, 828 S.W.2d 254, 258–59 (Tex. App. 1992). 
 223. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be inflicted.”). 
 224. See, e.g., Tilley v. State, 912 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Wyo. 1996); Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 
1377 (Wyo. 1986); Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986). 
 225. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be 
imposed, nor shall cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be 
unreasonably detained.”). 
 226. See, e.g., State v. White, 562 S.E.2d 305, 306–07 (S.C. 2002); State v. De La Cruz, 393 
S.E.2d 184, 186 (S.C. 1990); State v. Kiser, 343 S.E.2d 292, 293 (S.C. 1986); Stockton v. Leeke, 237 
S.E.2d 896, 898 (S.C. 1977); State v. Johnson, 567 S.E.2d 486, 487–88 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
 227. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive 
fines imposed.”). 
 228. People v. Baker, 229 Cal. Rptr. 3d 431, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting People v. 
Carmony, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 378 (Cal. Ct. App.2005)). 
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construe the state constitution separately from the Eighth Amendment229 and 
apply it more broadly than its federal constitutional counterpart.230 
The standard under the California Constitution is that “a punishment” 
may be unconstitutional “if . . . although not cruel or unusual in its method, it 
is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the 
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” 231 
Specifically, California courts examine three criteria to identify 
unconstitutional punishments: (1) the nature of the offense and defendant’s 
background, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to 
society; (2) the punishment for more serious offenses; or (3) punishment for 
similar offenses in other jurisdictions.232 It is worth noting that a defendant 
only needs to establish one of the criteria to demonstrate a constitutional 
violation. 233  This inquiry examines both the crime and the defendant’s 
criminal acts, as well as the defendant’s relevant personal mitigating 
characteristics.234 
Importantly, California courts have emphasized that in determining 
whether a punishment violates the state constitution, the courts must look 
beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society. This is because the standard of extreme 
cruelty is not merely descriptive but necessarily embodies a moral 
judgment. 235  Further, “cruel” as used in the California Constitution has 
retained its ordinary meaning of causing physical pain or mental anguish of 
inhuman or torturous nature.236 
Even with the broader analysis under their state constitution, California 
courts have not migrated away from the idea of gross disproportionality237 and 
have even upheld draconian three strikes sentences. 238 Indeed, California 
courts typically reject challenges to punishments under state constitutional 
law.239 
 
 229. People v. Palafox, 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), abrogated on other grounds 
by People v. Padilla, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 230. People v. Smithey, 978 P.2d 1171, 1225 n.1 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., concurring). 
 231. In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930 (Cal. 1972); see also People v. Garcia, 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 217, 
224–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 232. Lynch, 503 P.2d at 930–32; In re Nuñez, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 254 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); 
People v. Em, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 271 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also People v. Dillon, 668 
P.2d 697, 720–22 (Cal. 1983). 
 233. Dillon, 668 P.2d at 726 n.38; Nuñez, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 254. 
 234. People v. Landry, 385 P.3d 327, 382 (Cal. 2016); People v. Cage, 362 P.3d 376, 405 (Cal. 
2015); People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 884–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
 235. People v. Watson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 56–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 236. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 882 (Cal. 1972) (en banc). 
 237. People v. Edwards, 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
 238. See, e.g., People v. Mantanez, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 763–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 239. People v. Carmony, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“It is a rare case that 
violates the prohibition against cruel and/or unusual punishment.”); see also Cage, 362 P.3d at 406; 
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Similarly, the Michigan Constitution contains a disjunctive Eighth 
Amendment analogue.240 Michigan courts have recognized that the “or” makes 
the state constitutional provision broader than the Eighth Amendment.241 The 
state constitutional provision incorporates the Eighth Amendment’s gross 
disproportionality test but also adds an inquiry as to whether the punishment 
satisfies the goal of rehabilitation. 242  In essence, the Michigan approach 
shadows the Eighth Amendment but incorporates the purposes of 
punishment, particularly rehabilitation, into its analysis. As such, while 
Michigan courts certainly reject many state constitutional challenges,243 the 
courts have found it possible for non-capital punishments to be cruel or 
unusual.244 
Minnesota’s constitution prohibits cruel or unusual punishments. 245 
Minnesota courts indicate that this language requires two separate inquiries.246 
 
People v. Cunningham, 352 P.3d 318, 364 (Cal. 2015); People v. Jackson, 319 P.3d 925, 961–62 (Cal. 
2014); People v. Christensen, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); People v. Abundio, 
165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). But see People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 297, 727 (Cal. 
1983) (holding that, under the circumstances of the case, life imprisonment for first-degree felony-
murder was cruel and unusual). 
 240. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be 
imposed; cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; nor shall witnesses be unreasonably 
detained.”). 
 241. See, e.g., People v. Benton, 817 N.W.2d 599, 607 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Nunez, 
619 N.W.2d 550, 554 n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); Carlton v. Dep’t of Corr., 546 N.W.2d 671, 678 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (“In an appropriate case, the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against 
‘cruel or unusual’ punishment may be interpreted more broadly than the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition . . . .”). 
 242. See, e.g., People v. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d 264, 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (“Determining 
whether a punishment is cruel or unusual requires consideration of the gravity of the offense, the 
harshness of the penalty, a comparison of the penalty to penalties for other crimes in this state, a 
comparison of the penalty to penalties imposed for the same offense in other states, and the goal of 
rehabilitation.”); People v. Launsburry, 551 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 
 243. See, e.g., People v. Fluker, 498 N.W.2d 431, 431 (Mich. 1993); People v. Stewart, 256 
N.W.2d 31, 36–37 (Mich. 1977); People v. Burton, 240 N.W.2d 239, 241–42 (Mich. 1976); People v. 
Hall, 242 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Mich. 1976); People v. Powell, 750 N.W.2d 607, 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2008) (per curiam); People v. Poole, 555 N.W.2d 485, 492 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); People v. 
DiVietri, 520 N.W.2d 643, 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam), appeal denied, 408 Mich. App. 
886 (1995); People v. Cortez, 346 N.W.2d 540, 548–49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Landis, 361 
N.W.2d 748, 749 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam); People v. O’Donnell, 339 N.W.2d 540, 543–
44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (per curiam); People v. Johnson, 321 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982) (per curiam); People v. Kirchoff, 327 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam); 
People v. Korona, 326 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam); People v. Hamp, 312 
N.W.2d 175, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Ross, 251 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) 
(per curiam); People v. Gunn, 190 N.W.2d 793, 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (per curiam). 
 244. See, e.g., People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Mich. 1972); Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d at 
273. 
 245. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 246. See, e.g., State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 258 (Minn. 2014); State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 
263 (Minn. 2014) (“To determine whether a particular sentence is cruel or unusual under the 
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To determine whether a punishment is “cruel,” Minnesota courts compare the 
gravity of the offense to the severity of the sentence, using a proportionality 
test similar to the Eighth Amendment.247 To determine whether a punishment 
is “unusual,” Minnesota courts generally consider whether a consensus exists 
among the states that the sentence offends the evolving standards of 
decency.248 Despite the two-part inquiry, defendants challenging sentences 
under the state constitution typically do not prevail.249 
C. Alternatives 
Some state constitutions do not proscribe “cruel and unusual” or “cruel 
or unusual” punishments, but instead have different language to address 
unconstitutional punishments. Interestingly, many still follow the Eighth 
Amendment doctrine in evaluating punishments under their state 
constitution. 
1.  Adopting the Eighth Amendment Approach 
a. Cruel, but Not Unusual (Delaware, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, and South Dakota) 
Delaware’s constitution contains an Eighth Amendment analogue, but it 
prohibits only cruel punishments, not unusual ones.250 The initial approach of 
Delaware courts to the state constitutional analogue to the Eighth 
Amendment found that the courts should defer to the legislature completely 
and not place any limitations on punishment. 251 The Delaware Supreme 
Court’s subsequent analysis applies a gross disproportionality standard to the 
review of punishments under the state constitution.252 
Kentucky’s constitution similarly bans cruel punishments but not 
unusual ones.253 Despite the lack of prohibition for unusual punishments, 
 
Minnesota Constitution, we ‘separately examine whether the sentence is cruel and whether the 
sentence is unusual.’”). 
 247. See, e.g., Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 263; State v. Juarez, 837 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Minn. 2013); 
State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 753 (Minn. 2010); State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426, 438 
(Minn. 2003); State v. Pedersen, 679 N.W.2d 368, 377–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 248. See, e.g., Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 263; Juarez, 837 N.W.2d at 482. 
 249. Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 263–64; Juarez, 837 N.W.2d at 482–83; State v. Crow, 730 N.W.2d 
272, 281–82 (Minn. 2007); Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d at 438; State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 480 
(Minn. 1999); State v. Christie, 506 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Minn. 1993); McLaughlin v. State, 190 
N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 1971); State v. Dietz, 119 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Minn. 1963). 
 250. DEL. CONST. art I, § 11 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel punishments inflicted; and in the construction of jails a proper regard shall be had to the 
health of prisoners.”). 
 251. State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514, 517–18 (Del. 1963). 
 252. State v. Ayers, 260 A.2d 162, 169 (Del. 1969). 
 253. KY. BILL OF RIGHTS § 17 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.”). 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1201 (2020) 
1236 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
Kentucky courts track the Eighth Amendment and impose the same three-part 
gross disproportionality test under the state constitution.254 The Kentucky 
courts have upheld virtually all of the challenges to sentences under the state 
constitution.255 
Pennsylvania’s constitutional analogue to the Eighth Amendment bars 
cruel punishments, but not unusual ones.256 Pennsylvania courts have held 
that the state constitution provides no broader protections than the Eighth 
Amendment. 257  As a result, the Pennsylvania courts apply the Eighth 
Amendment gross disproportionality test, and defendants are unable to 
prevail under the state constitution.258 
The Rhode Island state constitutional analogue to the Eighth 
Amendment proscribes cruel punishments, but not unusual ones, as well as 
adding a proportionality requirement.259 The Rhode Island courts, however, 
do not distinguish between the state constitution and the Eighth 
Amendment, 260  using the gross disproportionality test as a bar to state 
constitutional claims of cruel and unusual punishment.261 
The South Dakota analogue to the Eighth Amendment proscribes cruel 
punishments, but not unusual ones.262 Nonetheless, South Dakota courts apply 
 
 254. See, e.g., Howard v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 471, 477–78 (Ky. 2016); Riley v. 
Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 622, 633 (Ky. 2003). 
 255. See, e.g., Howard, 496 S.W.3d at 634; Riley, 120 S.W.3d at 634; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 
125 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Ky. 2003); Harrison v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 172, 177 (Ky. 1993); Stark 
v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Ky. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. 
Commonwealth, 931 S.W.2d 446 (Ky. 1996); Brown v. Commonwealth, 818 S.W.2d 600, 601 (Ky. 
1991); Martin v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.2d 714, 714 (Ky. 1973); Walsh v. Commonwealth, 189 
S.W.2d 840, 841 (Ky. 1945); Covington v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1992); Collett v. Commonwealth, 686 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984). 
 256. PA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel punishments inflicted.”). 
 257. Commonwealth v. Bonner, 2016 PA Super 48, ¶ 8 n.18, 135 A.3d 592, 597 n.18; 
Commonwealth v. Elia, 2013 PA Super 323, ¶ 37, 83 A.3d 254, 267; Commonwealth v. Spells, 612 
A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).  
 258. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lankford, 2017 PA Super 166, ¶¶ 7–12, 164 A.3d 1250, 1252–53; 
Commonwealth v. Proctor, 2017 PA Super 30, ¶¶ 33–35, 156 A.3d 261, 274–76; Elia, 2013 PA Super 
at 323 ¶¶ 37–42, 83 A.3d at 267–69; Commonwealth v. Bucknor, 657 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1995) (per curiam); Commonwealth v. Gaddis, 639 A.2d 462, 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Spells, 
612 A.2d at 461; Commonwealth v. Strunk, 582 A.2d 1326, 1332–33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).  
 259. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel punishments inflicted; and all punishments ought to be proportioned to the offense.”). 
 260. Alessio v. State, 924 A.2d 751, 755 (R.I. 2007). 
 261. See, e.g., State v. Miguel, 101 A.3d 880, 883 (R.I. 2014); Alessio, 924 A.2d at 756; State v. 
Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 795–96 (R.I. 2007); McKinney v. State, 843 A.2d 463, 473 (R.I. 2004); 
Ret. Bd. of Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of State v. Azar, 721 A.2d 872, 881 (R.I. 1998); State v. Smith, 602 
A.2d 931, 938 (R.I. 1992). But see State v. Ballard, 699 A.2d 14, 17 (R.I. 1997) (holding that two 
consecutive life sentences were manifestly excessive), declined to follow by State v. Coleman, 984 A.2d 
650, 656 (R.I. 2009). 
 262. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 23 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel punishments inflicted.”). 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1201 (2020) 
2020] CRUEL STATE PUNISHMENTS 1237 
the gross disproportionality test in assessing punishments under the state 
constitution, making the analysis consistent with the Eighth Amendment 
approach of denying non-capital, non-JLWOP claims.263 
b. Disjunctive and Conjunctive (Maryland) 
Maryland’s two analogues to the Eighth Amendment are both 
conjunctive and disjunctive, prohibiting the infliction of “cruel and unusual 
pains” by the legislature264 and “cruel or unusual punishment” by the courts.265 
Despite the differing conjunctions, Maryland courts generally track the 
Eighth Amendment in applying the state constitution.266 
The general concept that the Maryland courts have adopted is that a 
punishment is satisfactory under the state constitution as long as it “conforms 
with the basic concept of human dignity and is neither cruelly inhumane nor 
disproportionate to the offense.” 267  Generally speaking, Maryland courts 
construe the state constitution in pari materia with the Eighth Amendment.268 
As with other states, Maryland courts have found most punishments 
constitutional under the state constitution. 269  On the occasions where 
Maryland courts have reversed cases, 270  they have adopted the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Solem v. Helm.271 
 
 263. See, e.g., State v. Bausch, 2017 SD 1, ¶ 38, 889 N.W.2d 404, 415; State v. Ainsworth, 2016 
SD 40, ¶¶ 8–9, 879 N.W.2d 762, 765; State v. Diaz, 2016 SD 78, ¶ 56, 887 N.W.2d 751, 768; State v. 
McCahren, 2016 SD 34, ¶ 37, 878 N.W.2d 586, 602; State v. Rice, 2016 SD 18, ¶ 29, 877 N.W.2d 75, 
85; State v. Traversie, 2016 SD 19, ¶ 19, 877 N.W.2d 327, 333; State v. Coleman, 2015 SD 48, ¶ 19, 
865 N.W.2d 848, 854; State v. Garreau, 2015 SD 36, ¶ 13, 864 N.W.2d 771, 776; State v. Brende, 
2013 SD 56, ¶ 38, 835 N.W.2d 131, 146; State v. Graham, 2012 SD 42, ¶ 43, 815 N.W.2d 293, 308;  
State v. Iannarelli, 2008 SD 121, ¶ 19, 759 N.W.2d 122, 127; State v. Blair, 2006 SD 75, ¶ 67, 721 
N.W.2d 55, 72–73; State v. Knecht, 1997 SD 53, ¶¶ 25–28, 563 N.W.2d 413, 422; State v. Gehrke, 
491 N.W.2d 421, 425 (S.D. 1992). But see State v. Bult, 529 N.W.2d 197, 200 (S.D. 1995) (reversing 
a sentence of life without parole for an eighteen-year-old because it shocked the conscience of the 
court).  
 264. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 16 (“That sanguinary Laws ought to be avoided as far 
as it is consistent with the safety of the State; and no Law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and 
penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time, hereafter.”).  
 265. Id. at art. 25 (“That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel or unusual punishment inflicted, by the Courts of Law.”). 
 266. Thomas v. State, 634 A.2d 1, 10 n.5 (Md. 1993). 
 267. Phipps v. State, 385 A.2d 90, 94 (Md. Ct. App. 1978) (citations omitted) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175, 182 (1976)). 
 268. Thompson v. Grindle, 688 A.2d 466, 470 n.5 (Md. Ct. App. 1997). 
 269. See, e.g., State v. Bolden, 737 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Md. 1999); Minor v. State, 546 A.2d 1028, 
1034 (Md. 1988); Hobbs v. State, 191 A.2d 238, 240 (Md. 1963); Martin v. State, 177 A.2d. 247, 249 
(Md. 1962); Dobson v. Warden, 135 A.2d 890, 891 (Md. 1957); Apple v. State, 59 A.2d 509, 513 
(Md. 1948); Clark v. State, 981 A.2d 710, 726 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); Horsman v. State, 570 
A.2d 354, 358 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Teeter v. State, 499 A.2d 503, 509–10 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1985); Washington v. State, 236 A.2d 32, 33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (per curiam). 
 270. Epps v. State, 634 A.2d 20, 24 (Md. 1993); Thomas, 634 A.2d at 7–9 (Md. 1993). 
 271. 463 U.S. 277, 290–92 (1983). 
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c. No Cruel and Unusual Analogue (Vermont) 
The Vermont Constitution does not contain a bar against cruel or 
unusual punishments, instead prohibiting only the imposition of 
disproportionate fines.272 As a result, the Vermont courts review challenges to 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.273 
2.  Adopting a Separate State Constitutional Approach 
a. Cruel, but Not Unusual (Washington) 
Washington’s constitutional analogue to the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes cruel punishments and does not also require them to be unusual.274 
Washington courts have made clear that the state constitution offers broader 
protections than the Eighth Amendment.275 
With respect to non-capital offenses, Washington conducts a separate 
analysis using a four-part test that contains elements of the Eighth 
Amendment’s gross disproportionality test and seldom allows defendants to 
prevail. 276  Specifically, the proportionality test under the Washington 
Constitution examines: (1) the nature of the offense, (2) the legislative 
purpose behind the statute, (3) the punishment the defendant would have 
received in other jurisdictions, and (4) the punishment meted out for other 
offenses in the same jurisdiction.277 
In some cases, the Washington Supreme Court has elected to impose a 
categorical ban under the state constitution on specific types of punishment. 
 
 272. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 39 (“All prosecutions shall commence, By the authority of the State of 
Vermont. All Indictments shall conclude with these words, against the peace and dignity of the State. And 
all fines shall be proportioned to the offences.” (emphasis added)). 
 273. See, e.g., In re Stevens, 2014 VT 6, ¶¶ 5–7, 195 Vt. 486, 488–90, 90 A.3d 910, 912–13; State 
v. Rideout, 2007 VT 59A, ¶ 28, 182 Vt. 113, 126–28, 933 A.2d 706, 716–17; State v. Alexander, 2005 
VT 25, ¶ 9, 178 Vt. 482, 484–85, 871 A.2d 972, 975; State v. Venman, 564 A.2d 574, 581 (Vt. 1989).  
 274. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel punishment inflicted”); State v. Witherspoon, 329 P.3d 888, 894 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) 
(“The Eighth Amendment bars cruel and unusual punishment while article I, section 14 bars cruel 
punishment.”). 
 275. State v. Whitfield, 134 P.3d 1203, 1216 (Wash. 2014); State v. Roberts, 14 P.3d 713, 733 
(Wash. 2000); State v. Ames, 950 P.2d 514, 517 n.8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
 276. See Wahleithner v. Thompson, 143 P.3d 321, 326 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); see also State v. 
Magers, 189 P.3d 126, 136 (Wash. 2008) (en banc); State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 489 (Wash. 
1996) (en banc); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 503 (Wash. 1996) (en banc); State v. Thorne, 921 
P.2d 514, 533 (Wash. 1996) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by 457 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2020); State 
v. Grenning, 174 P.3d 706, 720 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Whitfield, 134 P.3d at 1217 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2006); State v. Flores, 56 P.3d 622, 625 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Gimarelli, 20 P.3d 
430, 436 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); In re Haynes, 996 P.2d 637, 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); State v. 
Morin, 995 P.2d 113, 118 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); Ames, 950 P.2d at 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
 277. See State v. Fain, 617 P.2d 720, 726 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (reversing a grossly 
disproportionate sentence). 
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Recently, for example, Washington courts have held that the death penalty278 
and JLWOP violate the state constitution.279 
b. Implicit Cruel and Unusual (Connecticut) 
While not having an explicit textual proscription against cruel and 
unusual punishments, the Connecticut Constitution, as interpreted by 
Connecticut courts, bars cruel and unusual punishments.280 The Connecticut 
Supreme Court has explained that sections eight and nine of article one 
articulate due process protections that “prohibit governmental infliction of 
cruel and unusual punishments.”281 
The Connecticut Supreme Court has further indicated that the 
interpretation of its state constitutional provisions, while informed by the 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, constitutes its own inquiry.282 Until 
recently, the only applications of this doctrine related to the death penalty.283 
In 2015, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the death penalty violated 
the state constitution because it failed to satisfy any legitimate penological 
purpose and was unconstitutionally excessive as a punishment.284 
c. Retribution and Rehabilitation (Illinois) 
The Illinois Constitution does not have a provision that bars cruel and 
unusual punishments per se; it instead requires all penalties to relate to the 
seriousness of the offense with the goal of restoring the offender to society.285 
In other words, the state constitution requires punishments to be both 
retributive and rehabilitative.286 
 
 278. See State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 642 (Wash. 2018). 
 279. See State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 355 (Wash. 2018). 
 280. See CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 9; see also State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 73 (Conn. 2015). 
 281. State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1354 (Conn. 1994). 
 282. See generally Santiago, 122 A.3d at 18 (“These factors, which we consider in turn, inform our 
application of the established state constitutional standards—standards that, as we explain 
hereinafter, derive from United States Supreme Court precedent concerning the eighth 
amendment—to the defendant's claims in the present case.”). 
 283. See Santiago, 122 A.3d at 18 (applying doctrine to the death penalty); see also State v. 
Reynolds, 836 A.2d 224, 286 (Conn. 2003) (same); State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363, 390–91 (Conn. 
2003) (same); Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1354 (Conn. 1994) (same). The two non-capital challenges under 
the state constitution related to the application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012). In those cases, the Connecticut appeals courts rejected claims that the 
juvenile mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years was the equivalent of a mandatory 
JLWOP sentence. See State v. Hathaway, 172 A.3d 258, 260 (Conn. Ct. App. 2017); State v. Rivera, 
172 A.3d 260, 280 (Conn. Ct. App. 2017). 
 284. See Santiago, 122 A.3d at 73. 
 285. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness 
of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”). 
 286. See People v. Pace, 44 N.E.3d 378, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1201 (2020) 
1240 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
Illinois courts have interpreted their state constitution’s own 
proportionate penalties clause in a similar manner to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in non-capital, non-JLWOP cases.287 
Specifically, Illinois courts emphasize the necessity of both giving deference to 
the legislature and the need for the punishment to be so disproportionate as to 
shock the conscience of the community in order to violate the state 
constitution.288 
While a majority of offenders do not prevail on their disproportionate 
punishment claims under the state constitution,289 Illinois courts have found 
punishments to violate its proportionate penalties clause on several 
occasions.290 One reason that Illinois courts might depart from the practices of 
the Supreme Court in these cases while in theory applying a similar standard 
is that the Illinois courts must balance the goal of rehabilitation with the goal 
of retribution, making punishments more likely to be seen as 
disproportionate.291 
III.  CRUELTY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION TO PUNISHMENT 
With most state courts failing to impose any state constitutional 
restrictions on criminal sentences, the past three decades have seen a mass 
 
 287. See generally People v. Zetterlund, 127 N.E.3d 21, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (stating that the 
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N.E.3d 723, 731–32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); People v. Knox, 19 N.E.3d 1070, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); 
People v. Smolley, 873 N.E.2d 8, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); People v. Moore, 797 N.E.2d 217, 231 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2003); People v. Stork, 713 N.E.2d 187, 196 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 290. See, e.g., People v. Tetter, 121 N.E.3d 434, 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (holding that lifetime 
registration as a sex-offender was grossly disproportionate); see also People v. Taylor, 25 N.E.3d 627, 
633 (Ill. 2015); People v. House, 72 N.E.3d 357, 389 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (finding that the mandatory 
life sentence in that case shocks the moral sense of the community); People v. Lampkins, 26 N.E.3d 
601, 604–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
 291. See, e.g., Pace, 44 N.E.3d at 404–05 (explaining that the proportionate penalties clause calls 
for the balancing of the retributive and rehabilitative purposes of punishment; that balancing, in turn, 
requires that the court engage in an inclusive, holistic consideration of all of the factors in aggravation 
and mitigation, including the defendant’s age, demeanor, habits, mentality, credibility, criminal 
history, general moral character, social environment, and education, as well as the nature and 
circumstances of the crime and of defendant’s conduct in the commission of it). 
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incarceration epidemic unlike any in the history of the world.292 The United 
States currently incarcerates over 2.2 million people, comprising twenty-five 
percent of the world’s prison population, despite having only five percent of 
the world’s population.293 
Given these metrics, state and federal governments have recently started 
to engage in criminal justice reform with respect to low-level sentences and 
have reduced the sentences of first-time drug offenders.294 These changes, 
while promising, do not adequately address the proliferation of excessive 
punishments that still exist under the present state statutory regimes. 
Even so, the concept of cruelty as a constitutional bar to punishment 
does not, on its face, provide guidance to legislatures and courts concerning 
the extent to which states can impose particular sentences on criminal 
offenders. 295  An easy approach for state courts to address this problem, 
however, would be to follow the cruel part of the Supreme Court’s evolving 
standards of decency test which centers the proportionality analysis on the 
purposes of punishment. 
A. Evolving Standards of Cruelty 
Under the evolving standards of decency test, the second part of the 
analysis, as described above, assesses whether the criminal punishment in 
question satisfies one or more of the purposes of punishment.296 As explained 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, this part of the test requires the court considering 
a given punishment to use its own subjective judgment to assess whether the 
punishment imposed is appropriate or, alternatively, so cruel that it is 
inappropriate.297 To aid in that determination, the court looks at the purposes 
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 293. See, e.g., Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N. 56, 56 (2014). 
 294. See, e.g., First STEP Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 21 & 34 U.S.C.). 
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interpretive gap. See, e.g., William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 
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 296. See discussion supra Part I. 
 297. See discussion supra Part I. 
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of punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—to 
determine whether any one purpose justifies the punishment under 
consideration.298 In other words, the question the court assesses is whether the 
punishment satisfies one or more purposes.299 
1.  Applying the Purposes of Punishment 
Take, for instance, a sentence of ten years in prison for the offense of 
armed bank robbery. Under this approach, the court would investigate 
whether the sentence satisfied one or more purposes of punishment. First, the 
court would consider the purpose of retribution and inquire whether the 
offender deserved the ten-year sentence. Generally speaking, the “just deserts” 
retribution analysis examines the culpability of the offender and the harm 
caused to determine the appropriate sentence.300 If the offender deserved ten 
years, the sentence would satisfy the purpose of punishment. 
Deterrence could similarly serve as a valid justification for the sentence 
imposed if evidence existed demonstrating that the ten-year sentence 
effectively deterred other potential offenders from committing armed bank 
robbery. The presence of such evidence would mean that the sentence 
satisfied the stated purpose. 
Even if the sentence did not satisfy either the purposes of retribution or 
deterrence, it could still meet the constitutional requirement—being a 
sentence that is not cruel—if it could satisfy either of the other purposes of 
punishment: incapacitation or rehabilitation. If the state could demonstrate 
that the future dangerousness of the offender warranted a ten-year sentence, 
the sentence would meet the purpose of incapacitation. Similarly, if the state 
could demonstrate that a ten-year sentence was necessary to rehabilitate the 
offender, the sentence would satisfy the purpose of rehabilitation. 
If none of the purposes—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or 
rehabilitation—justified the sentence, it would be cruel, and thus 
unconstitutional under the state constitutional analogue to the Eighth 
Amendment. Note that this approach does not just apply to facial 
constitutional challenges, as in the categorical rules adopted by the Court in 
capital and JLWOP cases. Rather, the state could also consider as applied 
challenges. In other words, while a particular punishment might be 
appropriate generally, at least in some circumstances, the punishment is 
excessive in light of the relevant evidence in the case at issue. A second, 
implicit part of the court’s application of the evolving standards of decency 
 
 298. See discussion supra Part I. 
 299. See discussion supra Part I. 
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test—the concept of proportionality—fleshes out this idea and demonstrates 
its potential. 
2.  Assessing Proportionality 
Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s application of the purposes of 
punishment in its evolving standards of decency cases, the Court’s analysis 
also implicitly contains a proportionality component in the discussion of the 
purposes of punishment. Indeed, commentators often refer to the categorical 
limitations under the Eighth Amendment as proportionality restrictions. 
The examination of whether a particular sentence satisfies a purpose of 
punishment is rarely done in the abstract. It is possible to say, for instance, 
that the death penalty never satisfies the purpose of deterrence301 or the 
purpose of incapacitation.302 
More commonly, though, the question is whether the sentence is 
proportional as applied under the circumstances of the crime. While some 
have argued that the concept of proportionality pertains only to retribution,303 
a better approach is to apply this concept to all purposes of punishment.304 
The application of this limit of proportionality manifests itself in slightly 
different ways with respect to each purpose of punishment. 
The concept of just deserts retribution contemplates giving the offender 
a punishment no more than and no less than—i.e., proportional to—the 
offender’s culpability and the harm caused by the crime.305 The analysis with 
respect to just deserts retribution is virtually identical because proportionality 
is inherent in the concept of retribution. 
With respect to deterrence, the concept of proportionality raises the 
question of whether the sentence achieves a proportional amount of 
deterrence—that is, whether the sentence is long enough, but not longer than 
necessary to achieve the desired level of deterrence. Returning to the armed 
robbery example, at some point increasing the sentence will achieve only 
marginal additional deterrence, and then, at some further point, no additional 
 
 301. Compare Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, 
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deterrence at all. In assessing whether the purpose of deterrence justifies a 
sentence, then, the question is not only whether the sentence will actually 
deter, but also whether the sentence achieves the desired amount of deterrence 
with the lowest required sentence. If a sentence of five years would deter 99% 
of potential offenders from committing armed robbery, applying the concept 
of proportionality would lead to the conclusion that a ten-year sentence was 
cruel under the deterrence analysis. 
The same analysis also applies for the purposes of incapacitation and 
rehabilitation. If an offender that commits armed robbery will only be 
dangerous for five years into the future, a ten-year sentence would be a cruel 
punishment under future risk analysis because it is so disproportionate. If an 
armed robber needs only five years to achieve the level of rehabilitation 
allowing him to rejoin society without recidivating, then a ten-year sentence 
would be a cruel punishment. 
The concept of proportionality serves to prevent excessively long 
sentences when the U.S. Supreme Court considers the purpose of 
punishments. The sentence should be the least amount of time necessary to 
achieve the purpose of the punishment.306 
For constitutional purposes, this parsimony requirement of 
proportionality does not mean that the given state constitutional Eighth 
Amendment analogue should provide a basis to strike down every sentence 
that is slightly excessive. On the other hand, where the sentence is clearly 
excessive, state supreme courts should intervene to place reasonable limits on 
the ability of the prosecutors, legislatures, and judges to impose unnecessarily 
harsh sentences on criminal offenders.  
One issue that arises through the application of the purposes of 
punishment in this context is the likelihood of contradictory results as one 
shifts from purpose to purpose.307 As with the Supreme Court’s application of 
the Eighth Amendment, typically finding one purpose of punishment for 
which the sentence is proportional should suffice to allow the sentence to 
survive under the state constitution. As explored in Part IV below, however, 
there are many common sentences that are disproportionate under any 
purpose that deserve state constitutional scrutiny. 
B. Unlinking Cruel from Unusual 
Under the Court’s application of the Eighth Amendment, the cruelty 
inquiry remains part of a larger test in capital and JLWOP cases. It is not 
 
 306. Indeed, the federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553, provides as much, stating that 
“[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
purposes [of punishment].” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018). 
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really a part of the Court’s gross disproportionality test, which sets the bar so 
high—so unusual—that almost no non-capital, non-juvenile punishment is 
disproportionate, even if it is cruel. 
The Eighth Amendment, however, is an application of a prohibition of 
cruel “and” unusual punishments. If one examines state constitutions that link 
cruel and unusual disjunctively instead of conjunctively, the doctrine’s 
application should shift from the Eighth Amendment standards. Given the 
interpretive options discussed above with respect to the relevant conjunction, 
states that proscribe “cruel and unusual” punishments could also in theory find 
“cruel” punishments to violate the state constitution. 
In other words, prohibition of cruel punishments that need not be 
unusual opens the door to a broader analysis under state constitutions that use 
the disjunctive language (and perhaps even the conjunctive language). This 
occurs in two important ways—the elimination of jurisdiction counting and 
the removal of differentness as a limit on the scope of the constitutional 
provision. 
1.  Jurisdiction Counting No Longer Required 
Under the evolving standards of decency test, the first step in 
determining whether a particular sentence is cruel and unusual is considering 
whether a majority of jurisdictions still use the punishment for the crime in 
question. This state counting provides an objective measure of the evolving 
standards of decency, the current societal standard with respect to the 
punishment at issue.308 Where states continue to use a punishment widely in 
the context in question, then the punishment does not violate the evolving 
standards of decency.309 As a result, the Supreme Court would likely deny a 
petition for certiorari made under the Eighth Amendment if the punishment 
being challenged was one that states continued to use. 
If state supreme court interpretations of state constitutions simply 
mirror the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, then 
the unusual part of the evolving standards of decency test will limit any 
expansion of state constitutional law in this area unless the state court 
examines the issue from an intra-state perspective rather than an inter-state 
perspective.310 Practically, as explored above, many states limit the scope of 
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their constitutional provision to the scope that the Supreme Court has 
articulated under the Eighth Amendment.311 
With a disjunctive constitution that proscribes cruel “or” unusual 
punishments, the unusual part of the analysis disappears. State supreme courts 
in these situations are free to move beyond the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment and explore which punishments are merely cruel in order to limit 
the imposition of such punishments. 
Without the unusual requirement, state courts do not have to engage in 
state counting as the Supreme Court does under the evolving standards of 
decency. To the extent that state supreme courts merely adopt the Eighth 
Amendment analysis and outcomes, the counting of other states seems 
troubling, as the meaning of one state’s constitution should not depend on the 
practices of other states with respect to particular punishments. 
Perhaps most importantly, states with disjunctive Eighth Amendment 
analogues should endeavor to interpret the scope of their state constitution 
separately from the Eighth Amendment. Given that there is no requirement 
that a punishment must be unusual to be unconstitutional under a state 
constitution with disjunctive language, such states should engage in analysis of 
whether a particular punishment is indeed cruel. 
While making this shift with respect to death penalty and JLWOP 
means discarding half of the Eighth Amendment evolving standards of 
decency test, applying the gross disproportionality test and assessing non-
JLWOP and non-capital crimes both require a different approach. 
2.  Differentness No Longer Limits Analysis 
The differentness concept embodied in the Eighth Amendment depends 
in part on the idea that some punishments are unusual, and thus deserve 
higher scrutiny. If the language of the state constitution decouples the 
question of whether punishments are unusual from whether punishments are 
cruel, the analysis of cruelty does not require the kind of two-track approach 
to constitutional limits that the Supreme Court has utilized in applying the 
Eighth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court, as discussed above, provides a higher level of 
Eighth Amendment scrutiny to crimes that are “different.” Specifically, the 
Court applies the evolving standards of decency only in capital and JLWOP 
cases. 
This differentness analysis rests in part on the idea that these 
punishments—death and JLWOP—are unique, and, as such, have a higher 
likelihood of being unusual. The relatively sparse use of these punishments 
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(and they continue to become increasingly rare) reflects the idea that the need 
for Eighth Amendment scrutiny relates to their unusualness as punishments. 
Put another way, the differentness of the death penalty and juvenile life 
without parole stems from the limit on unusual punishments under the Eighth 
Amendment. An examination of the development of the Eighth Amendment 
doctrine bears out this connection. In Furman v. Georgia,312 several members 
of the Court in their opinions emphasized that the rarity of the use of the 
death penalty contributed to its arbitrary and random imposition and made it 
an unusual punishment.313 In Gregg v. Georgia,314 the Supreme Court allowed 
the new Georgia death penalty statute to survive the Eighth Amendment in 
light of new safeguards that presumably would remove the arbitrary and 
random choice of a few cases and replace it with a more principled set of tools 
designed to achieve consistent results.315 
In Coker v. Georgia,316 which applied the evolving standards of decency 
test, the Court incorporated its idea from Furman that rare use constituted 
unusualness.317 Specifically, the Court emphasized the rareness of punishing 
rape with death sentences.318 This approach continued through the Court’s use 
of the evolving standards of decency test in capital and juvenile life without 
parole cases.319 
By contrast, the Court’s analysis in non-capital cases has typically not 
explored the unusualness of the punishment in question. Instead, the 
application of the gross disproportionality test looks at the question of cruelty 
through disproportionality. In Solem v. Helm,320 the one non-capital case in 
the post-Furman era that has found a crime to be excessive, the Court’s 
proportionality analysis focused on the excessive nature of the penalty for the 
crime.321 The Court discussed looking to the practices of other jurisdictions as 
part of the analysis, but the inquiry did not seek to determine if the penalty 
had been imposed rarely in other jurisdictions for the crime in question.322 
Instead, the Court looked to the practices of other jurisdictions in order to 
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find objective confirmation that the punishment in question was excessive.323 
The Court has similarly ignored the question of unusualness in its other non-
capital, non-JLWOP Eighth Amendment cases in which it has used the gross 
disproportionality test.324 
The distinction is perhaps subtle, but nonetheless important. Because the 
Court equates differentness to unusualness, its reduced scrutiny for non-
capital cases need not apply when construing state constitutional analogues to 
the Eighth Amendment. State courts can read disjunctive state constitutions 
to require heightened scrutiny for cruel punishments because there is no 
differentness requirement under the state constitution. 
3.  Gross Disproportionality Need Not Be the Standard 
Finally, most state courts, as demonstrated above, have elected to defer 
to state legislatures blindly in their imposition of excessive punishments. 
Doing so means the courts have largely abdicated their role as the third branch 
of government entrusted with defending the state constitution. 
With respect to the U.S. Supreme Court, there may exist reasons why 
the Court should be hesitant to apply the U.S. Constitution to restrict the 
actions of Congress and state legislatures. The counter-majoritarian 
difficulty—the idea that the views of five Justices should not trump the will of 
the people as reflected in legislative judgments—suggests the Court should be 
wary of such judgments. Further, amending the U.S. Constitution is quite 
difficult. As a result, such decisions have a finality about them that other 
judicial decisions do not. This may be less true with respect to the Eighth 
Amendment in light of the Court’s adoption of the evolving standards of 
decency test, as the test incorporates a majoritarian objective requirement.325 
But in state courts, the counter-majoritarian difficulty does not exist. If 
state courts overreach, citizens have several available democratic responses. 
Citizens can vote for new justices in most states, and state constitutions are 
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generally quite easy to amend. Additionally, with respect to controversial 
issues, states can have referenda to determine the views of the people. 
Further, the protection against cruel and/or unusual punishments is a 
counter-majoritarian right—a protection of the individual against the 
excessive punitiveness of the majority. If state courts do not ever limit the 
ability of legislatures to punish, the state constitutional analogue to the Eighth 
Amendment becomes a dead letter and has no meaning. 
In light of all of these considerations, there is no requirement, 
constitutional or otherwise, that mandates a test of gross disproportionality in 
non-capital cases. This is particularly true when courts assume every 
punishment (or almost every punishment) satisfies that standard. Given the 
seriousness of the deprivation of freedom and the lifelong consequences felony 
convictions impose, it makes little sense to have a heightened standard for 
punishment. 
Just as guilt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, punishment 
should require some level of proportionality or at least connection to one or 
more purposes of punishment. The justification for the length of a criminal 
punishment should go beyond what the legislature or sentencing judge 
determined; it must have some proportional connection to the crime and 
relate to a purpose of punishment. The unwillingness of many state courts to 
examine this question seriously is stunning, invites abuse, and deprives many 
criminal defendants of their state constitutional rights. 
IV.  APPLYING STATE CONSTITUTIONS TO CRUEL PUNISHMENTS 
Having explored the state Eighth Amendment analogues and their 
approaches to punishment, this Article concludes by examining the effect of 
state courts taking state constitutional rights seriously in this context. 
Specifically, this part considers the practical implications of state supreme 
courts applying a strict proportionality test and/or using the purposes of 
punishment to assess criminal sentences. 
A. Capital Punishment 
In the death penalty context, state supreme courts should strongly 
consider whether, as the Washington Supreme Court recently found, the 
capital punishment violates their respective state constitutions. Irrespective of 
whether one believes in the efficacy of the death penalty, the current 
administration of the death penalty in the United States remains broken.326 
The proliferation of constitutional errors, innocent individuals on death row, 
racial injustice, arbitrary administration, and problems with methods of 
 
 326. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 136 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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execution all point to the likelihood that the death penalty, as applied, is an 
unconstitutional punishment. 
B. JLWOP 
Similarly, state supreme courts should consider holding that juvenile life 
without parole offenses violate state constitutions. The U.S. remains the only 
country in the world to impose such sentences, and states are increasingly 
abolishing JLWOP sentences after Miller v. Alabama. Abolition of juvenile 
life without parole does not mean that juveniles cannot serve life sentences; it 
simply means that one must give such sentences a second look or an 
opportunity for parole at some point. 
C. Life Without Parole 
Sentences of life without parole for adult offenders have similar 
problems. The decision to impose a life without parole sentence eliminates the 
possibility that an individual ever rejoins society—a very serious 
determination that state courts should not make lightly. This is one place 
where adopting a strict proportionality test instead of a gross 
disproportionality test might really matter. Further, state courts should 
seriously consider whether a purpose of punishment actually justifies a life 
without parole sentence. This is arguably not the case for most life without 
parole sentences—and is certainly not the case for all LWOP sentences that 
do not involve homicides. 
D. Excessive Sentences 
Finally, state courts should ask whether each sentence imposed is 
disproportionate and has a legitimate penal justification. Excessive sentences 
related to the crime committed do not necessarily have to involve 
incarceration for a decade or more. A five-year sentence for parking in a 
handicap parking spot without a tag, for instance, would clearly be a 
disproportionate punishment. 
State courts, particularly in light of the language of their state 
constitutions, have an obligation to assess the punishments imposed by 
legislatures, rather than blindly deferring to them. By reviewing cases using an 
as applied proportionality standard, state courts can uphold their state 
constitutions, protect against individual injustices, and curb punitive 
overreach by state legislators and trial judges. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated the need for state supreme courts to 
engage in more robust reviews of punishments under their applicable state 
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constitutional provisions. The shift in language from conjunctive to 
disjunctive opens the door for such interpretations, but also begs the question 
of why state courts do not engage more seriously with these Eighth 
Amendment analogues. Reversing the tide of blind deference to state 
legislative and sentencing decisions provides one possible way to begin to 
address the mass incarceration crisis that plagues states and their prisons. 
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APPENDIX 
The charts that follow summarize the current language of state 
constitutional analogues of the Eighth Amendment and the corresponding 
interpretive approaches of the states.  
The first chart divides the states in the same manner as the Article does, 
separating states into three broad categories—conjunctive, disjunctive, and 
other, before further breaking down the states by the language of the analogue 
and whether the state follows the Eighth Amendment approach or employs a 
separate state constitutional approach. 
The second chart provides a broader summary of the analogues. 
Specifically, it delineates the breakdown of states based on three broad 
categories of analogues: (1) those with identical language to the Eighth 
Amendment, (2) those with identical language plus another statutory 
requirement, and (3) those with different language. Most states, even those 
with different language, adopt the interpretive approach used by the Supreme 
Court in Eighth Amendment cases. 
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